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ABSTRACT: Over the past several years, law schools have experienced many 
challenges stemming from declines in student enrollment due to a shrinking 
applicant pool. The declining number of applicants is particularly 
problematic for law schools seeking to educate students in racially diverse 
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learning environments. In light of recent challenges to the constitutionality of 
race-conscious affirmative action and the likelihood that President Donald 
Trump will make several appointments to the Supreme Court—thereby 
shifting its balance toward the ideology of colorblindness—it is imperative to 
engage in a project that examines the relationship between racial categories 
and race-neutral identity factors in law-school admissions. Understanding 
the relationship between racial groups and certain race-neutral identity 
factors will help law schools comply with Fisher I’s mandate that universities 
consider race-neutral means for achieving diversity before using race as a 
factor in their admissions processes. Understanding this relationship will also 
be useful for higher-education institutions seeking to enroll racially diverse 
student bodies in jurisdictions that do not permit the consideration of race in 
admissions, and may become necessary for all institutions if the Court 
overrules the Fisher and Grutter decisions. Moreover, the data from this 
study illuminates persisting structural inequalities for certain racial minority 
groups and rebuts the assumption that those privileged enough to make it to 
law school are insulated from the structural inequalities that race-conscious 
affirmative action historically sought to address.  
This empirical study surveyed first-year law students at public American Bar 
Association approved law schools and asked them about race-neutral aspects 
of their identity, such as family background and educational-institution 
characteristics, to determine whether there is a relationship between their race 
and certain socioeconomic identity factors. The findings will enhance law 
schools’ understanding of race-neutral admissions factors that may contribute 
to their abilities to assemble racially diverse student bodies, and will give them 
tools to experiment with trying to yield racially diverse classes without asking 
applicants about their race. Possessing such knowledge will greatly aid law 
schools as they develop and implement admissions policies in their efforts to 
provide greater access to students from backgrounds underrepresented in the 
legal profession while also fulfilling their commitment to educate all law 
students in a diverse learning environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The past several years have been challenging for law schools because 
many have experienced declines in student enrollment due to a shrinking 
applicant pool.1 The declining number of applicants is particularly 
problematic for law schools in their attempts to enroll sufficient numbers of 
students to comprise incoming classes without sacrificing the numerical 
academic credentials of matriculating students. One such challenge concerns 
their efforts to educate students in racially diverse learning environments.2 
For several decades, law schools have recognized and actively pursued the 
educational and social benefits commonly associated with assembling racially 
diverse student bodies.3 In their efforts to enroll diverse classes, they have 
implemented strategies ranging from minority-targeted recruitment 
 
 1. See Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-schools-applications-fall-as-
costs-rise-and-jobs-are-cut.html; Benjamin Wermund, Shrinking Applicant Pool Has Law Schools 
Competing to Cut Costs, HOUS. CHRON. (June 1, 2014, 11:06 AM), http://www.houstonchronicle. 
com/news/education/article/Shrinking-applicant-pool-has-law-schools-5519781.php. 
 2. See generally Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 321 (2015). 
 3. See David Kow, The (Un)compelling Interest for Underrepresented Minority Students: Enhancing 
the Education of White Students Underexposed to Racial Diversity, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 157,  
159–61 (2010) (discussing the University of Michigan Law School’s theory in Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003), that educational benefits from a diverse student body constituted a 
compelling interest that met strict scrutiny); Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and 
Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1079, 1118 (2011) (discussing law schools that have made a commitment to “formal 
diversity”); cf. Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference in Law School Admissions: The Public Interest in a 
Diverse Legal Profession, 1 J.L. SOC’Y 17, 18 (1999) (“When racially preferential law school 
admissions policies were first adopted in the middle 1960s, the primary purpose for doing so was 
not to attain a racially diverse student body in law schools, although the programs had this clearly 
desirable educational effect.”). 
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programs4 to minority-targeted financial aid.5 Considering applicants’ races 
in admissions decisions has been pivotal to these efforts. 
Since Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.’s pronouncement in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke approving the limited consideration of race in 
higher-education admissions decisions,6 race-conscious affirmative action has 
been an invaluable tool by which to provide countless minority students the 
opportunity to pursue legal education. As private and public universities have 
modeled their admissions programs on Justice Powell’s discussion of 
permissible race-conscious policies,7 affirmative action has played a critical 
role in diversifying law schools and the legal profession.8 Unfortunately, this 
role has diminished significantly due to ballot initiatives such as Proposition 
209 in California9 and Proposal 2 in Michigan,10 as well as legal challenges—
most recently, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher I”).11 
Despite the effectiveness of race-conscious admissions plans in helping to 
provide higher-education opportunities for students of color,12 opponents of 
race-conscious affirmative action continue to maintain that such policies 
 
 4. See Catherine E. Smith, Seven Principles: Increasing Access to Law School Among Students of 
Color, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1689–92 (2011) (discussing pipeline efforts at the University of 
Denver Sturm College of Law). 
 5. See generally Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of Minority-Targeted 
Aid in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851 (2010); John Nussbaumer & Chris Johnson, The Door to Law 
School, 6 U. MASS. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 1, 28–29 (2011); Stephen B. Thomas & Judy L. 
Hirschman, Minority-Targeted Scholarships: More than a Black and White Issue, 21 J.C. & U.L. 555 (1995). 
 6. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (recognizing that in the 
context of higher-education admissions, “the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may 
be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of 
race and ethnic origin”). 
 7. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003); see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law 
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If the various opinions in Bakke mixed so many 
different colors that the result became rather muddy, that result was still clear enough to permit 
educators to rely upon the opinion that gave the decision its life and meaning . . . . More 
importantly, we are required so to do.”); Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1223 n.17 (2002) (discussing how Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke shaped 
UCLA School of Law’s admissions program and many others prior to Proposition 209). 
 8. See Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do 
Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 697 (2008) (concluding “that affirmative action is 
responsible for nearly all of the diversity currently seen in the law student population generally 
and at every law school of even moderate selectivity”). 
 9. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. 
 10. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 11. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). On June 23, 2016, 
the Supreme Court upheld the University of Texas’ race-conscious admissions plan challenged 
in Fisher I. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016). 
 12. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (1986) (“Affirmative action has strikingly benefited blacks as a group 
and the nation as a whole. . . . Without affirmative action, continued access for black applicants 
to college and professional education would be drastically narrowed. To insist, for example, upon 
the total exclusion of racial factors in admission decisions, especially at elite institutions, would 
mean classes of college, professional and graduate students that are virtually devoid of Negro 
representation.”); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.13 In 2003, the 
Supreme Court sanctioned the use of race-conscious admissions policies in 
higher education provided that universities adhere to constitutional 
standards of strict scrutiny as set forth by the Court.14 A decade later in Fisher 
I, the Court reiterated its prior holdings by holding that in order for an 
affirmative-action plan to pass constitutional scrutiny, the university 
implementing it must seek to achieve a compelling interest and its chosen 
means must be narrowly tailored to achieve it.15 
The question of whether considering race is necessary for a university to 
achieve its diversity goals is of paramount importance to the Court’s narrowly 
tailored inquiry.16 According to the Court, utilizing race-conscious admissions 
plans is impermissible if an institution of higher education “could achieve 
sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.”17 The impact of race-
neutral alternatives on the admissions process is central to this inquiry. 
Fisher I clarified that the constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions 
plan depends upon the reviewing court’s determination “that no workable 
race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity.”18 While some opponents of affirmative action have been quick to 
assert that universities have several effective race-neutral alternatives at their 
disposal to avoid harms commonly associated with non-diverse learning 
 
 13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, 
and state-provided education is no exception.”); id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the 
meddling of university administrators. . . . [and] I wish to see all students succeed whatever their 
color . . . .”). See generally Ward Connerly, It Is Time to End Race-Based “Affirmative Action”, 1 U. ST. 
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 56 (2007); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, 17 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 729 (2015). 
 14. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (holding that universities’ race-
conscious admissions policies must be “narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational 
diversity”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (sanctioning the “narrowly tailored use of race in admissions 
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a 
diverse student body.”). 
 15. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419–20. 
 16. Id. at 2420. 
 17. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
 18. Id. 
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environments,19 very little empirical evidence substantiates this claim.20 
Rather, several studies have shown that eliminating race-conscious affirmative 
action would result in dramatic declines in the acceptance and enrollment 
rates for African–American21 and Hispanic applicants, especially at highly 
selective institutions. Researchers Thomas Espenshade and Chang Chung 
found that elite institutions that discontinued their use of affirmative action 
would affect undergraduate admissions significantly: 
Acceptance rates for African-American candidates would fall from 
33.7 percent to 12.2 percent, a decline of almost two-thirds, and the 
proportion of African-American students in the admitted class would 
drop from 9.0 to 3.3 percent. The acceptance rate for Hispanic 
applicants would be cut in half—from 26.8 percent to 12.9 percent, 
and Hispanics would comprise just 3.8 of all admitted students 
versus an actual proportion of 7.9 percent.22 
 
 19. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 361–62, 367–71, (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (suggesting that universities try various race-neutral “admissions methods[] such as 
accepting all students who meet minimum qualifications,” decreasing reliance on standardized test 
scores, and employing percent plans instead of relying on affirmative action to diversify their student 
body); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8–9, 13–21, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) 2003 WL 176635, at *8–9, *13–21 (arguing that the 
University of Michigan School of Law’s race-conscious admissions policy was unconstitutional due 
to the availability of “ample race-neutral alternatives” by which to diversify its student body); Joshua 
P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An Opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 437, 473 (2011) 
(asserting that the University of Texas’ “race-neutral plan has been a demonstrable success”); L. 
Darnell Weeden, Employing Race-Neutral Affirmative Action to Create Educational Diversity While Attacking 
Socio-Economic Status Discrimination, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 297, 334 (2005) (advocating 
for the Supreme Court’s reconsideration of Grutter “[b]ecause the conceptual framework for 
effective race-neutral educational diversity demonstrated by the success of the Texas Top Ten 
Percent Plan could be designed to create true educational diversity based on socio-economic 
status”); Stephen Blea, Comment, The End of Affirmative Action: The Supreme Court’s Opportunity to 
Overrule Grutter, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1085, 1090–112 (2013) (discussing the Texas Top Ten 
Percent Plan as an effective race-neutral alternative to the University of Texas’ race-conscious 
admissions plan in Fisher I). 
 20. One recent study suggests that a class-based affirmative-action plan may be able to 
maintain existing levels of racial diversity on a moderately selective public-university campus, if 
the institution structures it to account for both disadvantage and overachievement. Matthew N. 
Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and Diversity, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 
379 (2013) (showing a class-based affirmative-action policy at the University of Colorado yielded 
underrepresented minority students at rates comparable to those produced by race-conscious 
affirmative-action policies). 
 21. The authors recognize that the term “black” is more inclusive and encompasses all 
people of African descent regardless of their ethnicity. For purposes of this study and this Article, 
we collapsed all participants reporting African ancestry into a single racial group and refer to 
them by using the terms black and African–American interchangeably. Bi-racial and multi-racial 
participants in the study who reported some African ancestry were excluded from the 
Black/African–American category in an effort not to privilege one component of their identity 
over the other(s). We also use the terms Hispanic and Latina/o interchangeably herein. 
 22. Thomas J. Espenshade & Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admission Preferences at 
Elite Universities, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 293, 298 (2005). 
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Their results were consistent with other researchers’ findings predicting steep 
declines in racial diversity if universities discontinue their use of race-
conscious admissions policies.23 
Researchers have also made similar predictions in the context of legal 
education. After examining 1990–1991 application and decision data for over 
90,000 applicants to 173 American Bar Association (“ABA”) approved law 
schools, Professor Linda Wightman found that there would be “a substantial 
reduction in the overall number of applicants of color who were offered 
admission to ABA-approved law schools” if the schools abandoned race-
conscious affirmative action.24 After replicating the study using 2000–2001 
data, Wightman concluded that if law schools stopped considering race in 
admissions, minority student representation would experience substantial 
reductions.25 
Indeed, there have been substantial declines in the number of students 
of color attending law schools—particularly those that are highly selective—
which have discontinued race-conscious affirmative action, despite 
implementing race-neutral alternatives.26 Following the 1995 adoption of a 
Board of Regents resolution prohibiting University of California (“UC”) 
 
 23. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 15–52 (1998); 
Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College 
Admissions, in AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
101, 101–56 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004); Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in 
College Admissions, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431, 431–56 (Christopher Jencks & 
Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); Victor B. Saenz et al., Losing Ground? Exploring Racial/Ethnic 
Enrollment Shifts in Freshman Access to Selective Institutions, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES, CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH 79, 95 (Gary 
Orfield et al. eds., 2007); David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action 
in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1857 
(2005);  Marvin Lim, Percent Plans: A “Workable, Race-Neutral Alternative” to Affirmative Action?, 39 
J.C. & U.L. 127, 142–48 (2013); Mark C. Long, College Applications and the Effect of Affirmative 
Action, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 319, 319–42 (2004); Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 8, at 652. 
 24. Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
14 (1997). 
 25. Linda F. Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness: Revisiting Prediction Models with 
Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 251 (2003). Wightman’s replication of the study 
using 2009–2010 data suggests similar conclusions regarding the detrimental impact of 
discontinuing the use of affirmative action in law-school admissions. LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS 
COUNS., UPDATED WIGHTMAN RACE-BLIND ADMISSION MODEL RESULTS: 2009–2010 APPLICANT 
DATA 1–2 (Aug. 2012), http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/publications-(lsac-resources)/ 
raceblindadmissionresults.pdf. 
 26. Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of “A Systemic 
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,” 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 9–10 (2005); 
Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 
11 (2001); Carmina Ocampo, Prop 209: Ten Long Years, NATION (Nov. 22, 2006), https://www. 
thenation.com/article/prop-209-ten-long-years; Julie J. Park, Black Men at UCLA: The Devastating Effects 
of Proposition 209, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Jan. 23, 2014) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-j-
park/black-men-at-ucla-the-dev_b_4297110.html; Erica Perez, Despite Diversity Efforts, UC Minority 
Enrollment Down Since Prop. 209, CAL. WATCH (Feb. 24, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/ 
despite-diversity-efforts-uc-minority-enrollment-down-prop-209-15031. 
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schools from considering race in admission decisions and the 1996 passage 
of Proposition 209 banning affirmative action in California, the percentage 
of underrepresented minority students at UC Berkeley Law School 
(“Berkeley”) declined from 25% in 1993 to 12% in 2005.27 UC Los Angeles 
School of Law (“UCLA”) experienced similar declines as its percentage of 
underrepresented minority students decreased from 32% in 1994 to 11% in 
2005, despite implementing race-neutral measures such as class-based 
affirmative action and new recruitment strategies.28 In 2014, neither Berkeley 
nor UCLA successfully enrolled the percentages of underrepresented 
minority students they had previously achieved in 1993.29 
Similar declines in racial diversity occurred at the University of Michigan 
Law School (“Michigan”) following the 2006 passage of Proposal 2, a state 
ballot initiative banning state universities from considering race in their 
admissions. In 2006, prior to Proposal 2, African–American students 
comprised 6.8% of Michigan’s first-year class.30 In 2008, the percentage 
decreased to 3.9%.31 Although the percentage of African–American first-year 
students increased to 4.7% in 2014, the overall percentage of  
African–American students at Michigan during the same year was only 3.6%.32  
Such declines in minority student enrollment evidence the difficulties 
that universities and law schools face as they endeavor to implement effective 
race-neutral alternatives so that students can realize the educational benefits 
of diversity. This study, which examines the relationship between the race of 
law students and their race-neutral identity factors, seeks to assist law schools 
in this endeavor. The findings of our study identify some race-neutral identity 
factors that align closely with race, such that a law school could experiment 
with them to determine whether it could achieve a racially-diverse class 
without asking applicants about their race.  
 
 27. Helen Hyun, Falling Sky: Trends in Minority Access to Law Schools, Pre- and Post-Gratz and 
Grutter, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES, 
CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH 105, 114–15 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 2007). 
 28. Id. 
 29. In 2014, Berkeley’s student body was comprised of 12.3% Hispanic students, 4.4% 
African–American students, and .4% American Indian students. UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY - 2014 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2014), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Std509InfoReport_2014.pdf. During the same year, UCLA’s 
enrollment was comprised of only 9.6% Hispanic students, 3.5% African–American students, and 
.9% American Indian students. UNIV. OF CAL., L.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES - 2014 
STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20150905181002/ 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/~/media/Assets/Admissions/Documents/Std509InfoReport-9-10-12-
02-2014%2013-11-58.ashx. 
 30. Greg Stohr, Black Enrollment Falls as Michigan Rejects Affirmative Action, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
23, 2013, 9:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-24/black-enrollment-
falls-as-michigan-rejects-affirmative-action. 
 31. Id. 
 32. UNIV. OF MICH., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 2014 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 
(2014), http://www.law.umich.edu/aboutus/Documents/Std509InfoReport-76-76-12-12-2014% 
2015-31-56.pdf. 
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Building on prior research examining racial diversity in legal 
education,33 this study surveyed first-year law students attending a cross-
section of public34 ABA approved law school.35 The participants were asked 
about various aspects of their backgrounds related to educational experiences 
and family circumstances. The study compared students’ responses to their 
self-identified racial categories to determine the relationship between 
students’ race and race-neutral identity factors. 
The findings presented herein suggest that considering certain race-
neutral factors may equip law schools with a means to test whether they could 
use race-neutral admissions to assemble racially diverse classes.36 Because 
African–American and Hispanic students are significantly more likely than 
 
 33. See generally Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solórzano, Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and 
Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA 
L.J. 237 (2001); Meera E. Deo et al., Paint by Number? How the Race and Gender of Law School Faculty 
Affect the First-Year Curriculum, 29 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 1 (2010); Meera E. Deo, The 
Promise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University of Michigan Law School, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
63 (2011); Meera E. Deo et al., Struggles & Support: Diversity in U.S. Law Schools, 23 NAT’L BLACK 
L.J. 71 (2010); Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt 
Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241 (2000); Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 8; Richard H. Sander, A Systemic 
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004); see also generally 
CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, THE EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY PROJECT: 
ANALYSIS OF LONGITUDINAL AND CONCURRENT STUDENT AND FACULTY DATA (2010), http://www. 
lsac.org/docs/default-source/research-(lsac-resources)/gr-10-01.pdf. 
 34. For the purposes of this study, a “public” law school is a law school that is situated within 
a broader university structure that legislative action created, and receives an annual funding 
appropriation from a government. 
 35. The study focuses on ABA approved law schools because the ABA Council on Legal 
Education, the accrediting body for law schools, imposes a diversity standard that all law schools 
must satisfy. Consequently, ABA approved law schools have a need to be concerned with diversity 
in the student body in order to be in compliance with ABA regulations. ABA Standard 206, which 
governs diversity and inclusion, provides: 
(a)      Consistent with sound legal education policy and the Standards, a law school 
shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by 
providing full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession by 
members of underrepresented groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities, and 
a commitment to having a student body that is diverse with respect to gender, race, 
and ethnicity. 
(b)      Consistent with sound educational policy and the Standards, a law school 
shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by 
having a faculty and staff that are diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS  
2015–2016, at 12 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/ 
legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_aba_standards_for_approval_of_law_schools_final. 
authcheckdam.pdf. 
 36. See infra Parts V and VI. Not all law schools are similarly situated. Some draw students from 
local regions while others have a very diverse applicant pool. Moreover, applicant pools change from 
year to year. Consequently, the tools provided by the findings of this study might work to aid some 
law schools in achieving a racially diverse student body while at the same time fail to achieve racial 
diversity at other law schools. Likewise, the tool could work at a law school for while then cease to 
be effective if there are significant changes in the applicant pool. For this reason, it is important for 
law schools to test the viability of the methodology in the study rather than assuming that it will yield 
a critical mass of students from groups underrepresented in law school.  
A9_NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2017  12:01 AM 
2196 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:2187 
white students to endorse race-neutral factors such as qualifying for free or 
reduced lunch during elementary and secondary school, receiving a Pell 
Grant during college, and having a parent or guardian who received public 
assistance while he or she was growing up,37 law schools’ consideration of 
these and similar factors in their admissions decisions may be a useful way for 
law schools to test, in a single admission cycle, whether using race-neutral 
means is sufficient to achieve their diversity goals. A law school could ask 
questions on its application regarding these race-neutral identity factors and 
weight them in the admissions process.38 In so doing, the law school would 
effectively expand the definition of merit beyond academic credentials to 
include applicants who have demonstrated determination to overcome 
structural challenges. Redefining merit in this way could help ensure that the 
enrolling class would be diverse, because not all applicants would have 
demonstrated merit merely through their Law School Admission Test 
(“LSAT”) score and undergraduate grade point average (“UGPA”). 
Moreover, an admissions standard that seeks to admit students who have 
overcome structural inequality strikes at the heart of what proponents 
originally intended race-conscious affirmative action to do.  
This Article reports on research that provides law schools with tools by 
which to experiment with race-neutral admissions. The research was confined 
to 10 law schools. Consequently, it does not claim that all law schools, or any 
law school, will be able to assemble a racially diverse class using race-neutral 
admissions. Instead, it argues that law schools now have some data to use for 
experimenting with a race-neutral admissions cycle as a means of complying 
with Fisher I’s mandate that schools seriously consider race-neutral alternatives 
before resorting to the use of race.39  
It is important to note that although the study found statistically 
significant relationships between race and certain race-neutral identity 
factors, this Article does not advocate for the wholesale substitution of 
traditional race-conscious admissions measures with them. Rather, it 
encourages law schools to utilize such race-neutral factors in their admissions 
processes as a means of complying with Fisher I and testing the viability of race-
neutral measures. Also, because there were some schools in our sample that 
 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. Admittedly, these types of questions are very personal in nature, and some applicants 
might not wish to answer them. Consequently, we recommend that law schools make the 
questions optional and explain why they are being asked. For example, the application could 
state: We define merit by looking beyond LSAT scores and UGPAs to ascertain whether candidates for 
admission have overachieved relative to the advantages or disadvantages they have experienced. If you want 
the admissions committee to consider your achievements pursuant to this more thorough assessment, please 
answer the following questions. 
 39. Experimentation might take the form of a race-neutral admissions cycle, but for those 
law schools that do not wish to risk experiencing a loss of diversity, the experimentation could be 
done by conducting a parallel phantom race-neutral admission cycle with all or a random portion 
of the applicant pool to compare the outcome of a race-neutral approach with the outcome of a 
race-conscious approach. If the race-conscious approach produced significantly more racial 
diversity than the race-neutral approach, the law school would know that it should not attempt a 
race-neutral admission because considering race was necessary to achieve a racially diverse class. 
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had very low levels of racial diversity, a race-neutral admission cycle might 
increase the percentages of students from underrepresented racial groups by 
eliminating implicit bias that may be operating in some admissions processes 
effectively to stop admissions of applicants from underrepresented groups 
once there appears to be a critical mass of non-white students. On the other 
hand, schools with such little diversity that there is no critical mass of any 
underrepresented racial group may find that their diversity suffers even more 
when they eliminate racial considerations from their admissions decisions. 
Consequently, each law school must conduct its own mini-study to determine 
whether using race-neutral admissions would sustain or improve diversity 
there. It is our hope that this study provides some tools for law schools to use 
to engage in such experimentation. 
Experimenting with a race-neutral admission cycle could expand 
educational opportunities for students of color at some law schools while also 
addressing opponents’ and proponents’ concerns that current affirmative-
action policies violate the Constitution40 and/or disproportionately benefit 
privileged minority students from middle- and high-class backgrounds.41 
Based on the sample of participants in our study, it is clear that privilege did 
not catapult many law students of color to law school. Many of them had to 
overcome the structural inequalities of public education, poverty, and race to 
make it to law school. Expanding opportunities for these and other minority 
students will benefit not only legal education and the legal profession, but 
also society more broadly.  
Part II briefly examines the current state of racial diversity in ABA 
approved law schools. It discusses the historical underrepresentation of 
certain minority groups in law school, which has led to a profound lack of 
racial diversity in the legal profession. Part III discusses the constitutional 
landscape governing the use of race-conscious affirmative action in higher 
education. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Fisher I, this Part 
explains why empirically examining the availability and viability of race-
neutral measures to achieve student-body diversity is an important and 
necessary endeavor. 
Part IV examines the Texas Ten Percent Plan as a race-conscious model 
of race neutrality and describes the study’s design and methodology. Part V 
presents our study’s descriptive and inferential findings. Based on these 
findings, Part VI offers observations and suggestions to aid law schools as they 
develop and implement admissions policies to provide greater access to 
students from backgrounds that are underrepresented in the legal profession. 
 
 40. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 41. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 80 (1991); 
CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 250–51, 260–62 (2004); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social 
Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1476–77 (2005); 
Sheryll Cashin, Place, Not Race: Affirmative Action and the Geography of Educational Opportunity, 47 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 935, 940–41 (2014); Mark Nadel, Retargeting Affirmative Action: A Program to 
Serve Those Most Harmed by Past Racism and Avoid Intractable Problems Triggered by Per Se Racial 
Preferences, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 323, 325–27 (2006). 
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Engaging in this endeavor will help law schools fulfill their commitment and 
obligation to educate all law students in a diverse learning environment. 
II. THE DIVERSITY DILEMMA IN LAW SCHOOLS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Like other post-baccalaureate degree-granting institutions,42 law schools 
have experienced an overall increase in racial diversity over the past several 
decades. From 1971 to 2014, the total enrollment of minority students in ABA 
approved law schools increased from 6.1% to 26.9%.43 Similarly, the 
percentage of Juris Doctor (“JD”) degrees awarded to minority students 
increased from 8.6% to 25.5% between 1983 and 2013.44 While these 
statistics are significant achievements, a closer examination of diversity in law 
schools and the legal profession reveals disconcerting realities that counter 
the beneficial promise of these figures. 
Consider, for instance, the percentage of historically underrepresented 
minority students, such as African–Americans and Hispanics,45 who attend the 
 
 42. From 1976 to 2013, the percentage of racial/ethnic minority U.S. residents enrolled in 
degree-granting post-baccalaureate institutions increased from 10.4% to 33.5%. Table 306.10: 
Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions, by Level of Enrollment, Sex, Attendance 
Status, and Race/ethnicity of Student: Selected Years, 1976 through 2013, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_306.10.asp (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2017). 
 43. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA APPROVED 1ST YEAR JD AND MINORITY ENROLLMENT: FALL 2013, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_ 
to_the_bar/statistics/2013_jd_enrollment_1yr_total_minority_.xls (last visited Apr. 20, 2017); AM. 
BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS YEAR 2016, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-tables-2016.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).  
 44. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA APPROVED TOTAL JD AND MINORITY DEGREES AWARDED: FALL 2013, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_ 
to_the_bar/statistics/2013_jd_degrees_minority.xls (last visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
 45. Although discussing racial diversity broadly encompasses members of all racial and 
ethnic minority groups, university administrators, jurists, scholars, and policymakers often refer 
“to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like 
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans,” when discussing policies affecting 
underrepresented minority students. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (internal 
citations omitted). As noted by Judge Henry Ramsey, Jr.: 
Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans experience poorer health and substantially 
lower levels of health care, fewer high school and college graduates, a greater 
percentage of high school drop outs, an Internet gap, higher rates of 
unemployment, higher arrest rates, higher criminal convictions and incarceration 
rates, higher rates of teen-age pregnancy, higher levels of family poverty, lower home 
ownership rates, and lower levels of savings and investment in securities than white 
Americans . . . . I have no doubt that these are continuing consequences of centuries 
of American racism, and, particularly, the horrific discrimination that occurred in 
the United States during the first six decades of the Twentieth Century. 
Henry Ramsey, Jr., Response to Dean Herma H. Kay’s Affirmative Action Paper, 34 IND. L. REV. 87, 89 
(2000). For thought-provoking discussions regarding the beneficiaries of affirmative action, 
particularly within the black community, see generally Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the 
Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective 
Higher Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1230 (2008) (discussing how “blacks whose 
predominate ancestry is traceable to the historical oppression of blacks in the United States are 
likely more underrepresented in affirmative action than most administrators, admissions 
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country’s highest-ranked law schools, as determined by U.S. News & World 
Report. In 2014, the African–American enrollment at each of the top fifteen 
law schools did not reach 9%.46 Harvard Law School’s (“Harvard’s”) 
enrollment was the highest at 8.7%, while Michigan’s African–American 
enrollment was the lowest at 3.6%.47 For the 2015–2016 academic year, the  
African–American enrollment at Harvard and Michigan increased to 9%48 and 4%,49 
respectively. At Yale Law School (“Yale”), which is consistently ranked as the top law school 
in the country,50 African–American enrollment decreased from 6.9% in 2014 to 6.2% in 
2015.51 
Sadly, the Hispanic enrollment at these and other highly selective law 
schools is similarly low. During the 2015–2016 academic year, Hispanic 
students accounted for 8.3% of Yale’s student body52 and 9.2% of Harvard’s.53 
The Hispanic enrollment at Michigan during the same academic year was only 
3.7%.54 Therefore, although the total minority enrollment at these and other 
top-ranked schools may be as high as 32.9% largely due to Asian student 
enrollment, as was the case at Yale during the 2015–2016 academic year,55 the 
enrollment of traditionally underrepresented minority students continues to 
be disproportionately low at law schools throughout the country. This 
unfortunate reality detrimentally impacts not only the law schools but also the 
legal profession more broadly. 
In recent years, minority law students across the country have fervently 
voiced their concerns regarding issues related to the lack of diversity and 
inclusion on their campuses. The scope of their concerns has included the 
lack of student, faculty, and staff diversity; law schools’ failure to adequately 
include the perspectives of communities of color in the presentation and 
 
committees, or faculties may realize”); and Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1138 (2007) (analyzing the generational admission statistics of black students). 
 46. Ranking the Top Law Schools by Their Percentage of Black Students, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 
(Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.jbhe.com/2014/12/ranking-the-top-law-schools-by-their-percentage-of-
black-students [hereinafter Ranking the Top Law Schools]. 
 47. See id. (showing Top Law School Rankings). 
 48. HARVARD LAW SCH., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL - 2015 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 
(2015), http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2015/12/2015-ABA-Standard-509-Report.pdf. 
 49. UNIV. OF MICH., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 2015 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 
(2015), http://www.law.umich.edu/aboutus/Documents/Std509InfoReport-76-76-12-17-2015_ 
12-57-08.pdf. 
 50. See Derek Tam, Briefly: Law School Tops U.S. News Rankings—Again, YALE DAILY NEWS 
(Apr. 24, 2009), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2009/04/24/briefly-law-school-tops-u-s-news-
rankings-again (reporting that U.S. News & World Report has ranked Yale No. 1 every year since it 
began ranking law schools in 1983). 
 51. See Ranking the Top Law Schools, supra note 46; YALE UNIV., YALE UNIVERSITY - 2014 
STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org; YALE 
UNIV., YALE UNIVERSITY - 2015 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2015), http://www. 
abarequireddisclosures.org. 
 52. See YALE UNIV., supra note 51, at 1. 
 53. HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 48, at 1. 
 54. UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 49, at 1. 
 55. See YALE UNIV., supra note 51, at 1. 
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discussion of course material; and schools’ utilization of offensive institutional 
symbols.56 Many students of color, particularly African–American law 
students, have felt isolated and pressured to be “spokespersons for their race” 
due, in part, to the lack of diversity on their campuses.57 Considering that 
these are precisely the feelings that schools intend diverse learning 
environments to combat,58 recent student accounts demonstrate the failure 
of some law schools to enroll a sufficient number of minority students to 
achieve this goal successfully. 
While the lack of meaningful racial diversity in any educational setting is 
troubling, it is especially problematic when it occurs at highly selective elite 
colleges and law schools. As the Supreme Court recognized in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, the most selective higher-education institutions play a critical role in 
educating those citizens who are likely to become the nation’s future 
leaders.59 This is particularly true “when it comes to highly selective law 
schools” because they can serve as gateways to the country’s most prominent 
governmental and legal professional positions.60 
As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in Grutter, “[a] handful of these 
schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States 
Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States 
District Court judges.”61 In addition, the vast majority of tenured and tenure-
track professors in the legal academy typically graduate from a small subset of 
 
 56. See Jordan Raymond, Why I’m Sleeping in Belinda Hall, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/3/4/raymond-belinda-hall-protest (detailing students’ 
concerns at Harvard Law School); Terrell Jermaine Starr, Black Washington And Lee Law Students Say 
They Were ‘Bamboozled’ About School’s Diversity, NEWSONE, https://newsone.com/3005288/black-
washington-and-lee-law-students-say-they-were-bamboozled-about-schools-diversity (last visited Apr. 20, 
2017) (reporting students’ concerns at Washington and Lee University School of Law); Samantha 
Tomilowitz & Sam Hoff, UCLA Law Students Protest Lack of Diversity, DAILY BRUIN (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:10 
PM), http://dailybruin.com/2014/02/10/ucla-law-students-protest-lack-of-diversity (discussing 
students’ concerns at UCLA School of Law). 
 57. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318–19 (2003); see also Tomilowitz & Hoff, supra note 56. 
 58. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (“The 
attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values beyond race alone, including enhanced 
classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
318–19 (discussing a university official’s testimony concerning practices meant to ensure “that 
underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”); 
Vinay Harpalani, The Double-Consciousness of Race-Consciousness and the Bermuda Triangle of University 
Admissions, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 821, 832 n.41 (2015) (discussing university efforts to create a 
“critical mass”). 
 59. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (discussing the importance of diversity in the “country’s . . . 
most selective [educational] institutions’” to facilitate “a highly qualified, racially diverse [military] 
officer corps” (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 29, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 
2003 WL 1787554, at *29)); id. at 332 (“Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, 
represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders.”). 
 60. Id. at 332. 
 61. Id. 
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highly ranked law schools,62 most notably Harvard and Yale.63 Considering 
that “underrepresented minority graduates of elite U.S. law schools . . . have 
strongly disproportionate leadership contributions (relative to other law 
schools) in the ranks of corporate law firm partners, the professoriate and the 
federal judiciary,”64 the lack of racial diversity in these schools and law schools 
more broadly has led to a lack of diversity in many facets of the legal 
profession.65 
Recently, Professor Deborah Rhode has described law as “one of the least 
racially diverse professions in the nation.”66 Despite the nearly 29% of 
minority students enrolled in law school during the 2013–2014 academic 
year,67 lawyers of color account for only 12% of the profession in 2010.68 The 
percentages are even lower at the higher echelons of the legal profession, 
where only 9% of general counsels at large corporations and 7% of law-firm 
partners are minority attorneys.69 People of color are also underrepresented in 
legal academia, where roughly 85% of male tenured professors and 77% of female 
tenured professors are white.70 
 
 62. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: One 
Dean’s Perspective, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1549, 1559 (2011) (identifying a degree from an elite law 
school as a desired credential for law schools seeking to hire new professors); Richard E. Redding, 
“Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal 
Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 594–95 (2003) (discussing the historical and accelerating 
trend of law faculties hiring graduates “from a handful of elite law schools”); L. Darnell Weeden, 
Back to the Future: Should Grutter’s Diversity Rationale Apply to Faculty Hiring? Is Title VII Implicated?, 
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 511, 534 (2005) (discussing elite law schools’ desire to hire faculty 
members with similar elite academic credentials). 
 63. See Justin McCrary et al., The Ph.D. Rises in American Law Schools, 1960-2011: What Does It 
Mean for Legal Education?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543, 554 (2016); Redding, supra note 62, at 606–07. 
 64. William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 
J.C. & U.L. 53, 119 (2013); see also Chambers et al., supra note 23, at 1866 (noting that “the 
earnings of graduates of lower-tier schools are in general much lower than the earnings of the 
graduates of elite schools”); Johnson, supra note 62, at 1559 (“Many law schools aggressively 
recruit minority faculty candidates, with the competition especially keen for those with the most 
elite credentials.”). 
 65. See Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 26, at 8 (“Severe underrepresentation of 
minorities can be found in legal education, the bar, and judiciary.”); Weeden, supra note 62, at 
539 (observing that law schools’ requirement of elite academic credentials for faculty hires will 
produce “social barriers that unnecessarily promote racial and ethnic stratification”). 
 66. Deborah L. Rhode, Law is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And Lawyers Aren’t Doing 
Enough to Change That., WASH. POST: POSTEVERYTHING (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-diverse-profession-in-the-nation-and-lawyers-
arent-doing-enough-to-change-that/?utm_term=.d480280076f0. But see generally Jason P. Nance & Paul 
E. Madsen, An Empirical Analysis of Diversity in the Legal Profession, 47 CONN. L. REV. 271 (2014) (finding 
that although racial minorities continue to be underrepresented in the legal profession, the profession 
is on par with other professions when it comes to diversity). 
 67. See AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS YEAR 2016, supra note 43. 
 68. See id.; Rhode, supra note 66 (explaining that 88% of lawyers are White). 
 69. Rhode, supra note 66. 
 70. AM. BAR ASS’N, DATA FROM THE 2013 ANNUAL QUESTIONNAIRE: ABA APPROVED LAW SCHOOL 
STAFF AND FACULTY MEMBERS, GENDER AND ETHNICITY: FALL 2013 (2013), http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dah/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statitstics/2013
_law_school_staff_gender_ethnicity.xlsx; see also Meera E. Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal 
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Although legal scholars and practitioners often cite to a “pool problem” 
to explain the lack of racial diversity among their ranks71—a claim that is 
highly debatable72—increasing racial diversity in law schools would be an 
important first step in helping eliminate the stark racial disparities that 
currently plague the legal profession. Historically, affirmative action has 
served as an invaluable tool by which to diversify law schools.73 However, as 
the next Part details, the Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin cautions law schools’ continual reliance on the use of race in 
admissions without sufficient justification for employing such measures.74  
III. ACHIEVING DIVERSITY THEN AND NOW 
A. THE BAKKE GUIDEPOST 
For several decades, institutions of higher education—including law 
schools—have recognized the social and educational benefits that 
commentators commonly associate with diverse learning environments.75 
Such benefits range from promoting greater understanding between students 
of different races76 to legitimizing our democracy and its leaders.77 In their 
efforts to achieve these and other diversity-begotten benefits, colleges and 
universities have employed a wide variety of measures to assemble racially 
diverse student bodies.78 Realizing that “[t]he tools for constructing the pool 
of potential applicants are indissolubly linked to the goal of constructing a 
 
Academia, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 352, 357 (2014) (stating that, in 2014, at least 72% of law 
faculty members were white); Weeden, supra note 62, at 513–14 (citing statistics showing low minority 
representation on law school faculties). 
 71. See Rhode, supra note 66 (reporting that surveyed attorneys “attributed the under-
representation of minorities to the lack of candidates in the pool”). 
 72. See Deo, supra note 70, at 359–64 (rejecting the claim that the lack of minority female 
law professors is due to a non-diverse pool of applicants); Rhode, supra note 66 (challenging the 
“pool problem” contention and attributing minority lawyers’ high rates of attrition in law firms 
to several factors such as unconscious bias and lack of mentoring, networking and client-
development opportunities). 
 73. See supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III. 
 74. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 75. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1144–46 (2013); 
Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity 
Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 446–49 (2014); Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 586–92 (2009). 
 76. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The 
Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 113, 129–32 (2012) (discussing university administrators’ challenges in ensuring that 
cross-racial understanding actually takes place on diverse campuses). 
 77. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332; see also Stacy Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: 
Confronting the Reality of Our Inequality, 66 MERCER L. REV. 577, 607–08 (2015) (discussing the 
aspirational goal of democratic legitimacy as embedded within the diversity rationale). 
 78. See generally OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN 
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO DIVERSITY (2003), https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/ERIC-ED475547/pdf/ERIC-ED475547.pdf (discussing a variety of race-neutral 
developmental and admissions programs utilized by colleges and universities in their attempts to 
diversify their student bodies). 
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diverse learning environment,”79 institutions have attempted to increase the 
number of minority applicants to their schools by establishing regional 
admissions offices in minority-populated cities and dispatching recruiters to 
predominantly minority high schools and colleges.80 They have also offered 
minority-targeted financial aid in the forms of race-conscious and race-
exclusive awards to encourage students of color to attend their schools.81 
Although these and similar programs have been and continue to be 
integral in diversifying higher education,82 institutional employment of race-
conscious affirmative action has been one of the most effective measures for 
assembling a diverse student body.83 By considering an applicant’s race as one 
of many factors when making admissions decisions, universities directly 
capture those students whose life experiences have been shaped, in part, by 
their identity as a racial minority. The unique experiences and perspectives 
that these students bring into the academic environment are vital to 
universities achieving the educational benefits of diversity. Therefore, 
proponents of affirmative action rely upon this diversity rationale to justify the 
use of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.84 
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell first articulated the diversity 
rationale nearly 40 years ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.85 
Although the Court invalidated the University of California at Davis Medical 
School’s (“Medical School’s”) separate admissions program for minority 
 
 79. Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View From a Limestone Ledge, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1599 (2003). 
 80. See CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, CIVIL RTS. PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV. PERCENT 
PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES’ EXPERIENCES 55 (2003), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/admissions/percent-plans-in-college-
admissions-a-comparative-analysis-of-three-states2019-experiences/horn-percent-plans-2003.pdf. 
 81. See James, supra note 5, at 854 (distinguishing between race-conscious aid that considers 
race “as one of many factors . . . in selecting award recipients” and race-exclusive aid that “limit[s] 
aid eligibility to applicants from a minority racial or ethnic group”). Colleges and universities 
have also employed race-neutral financial aid programs, such as the Longhorn Scholars Program 
implemented at the University of Texas following the Fifth Circuit’s ban on affirmative action in 
Hopwood v. Texas, to assemble a racially diverse student body. Torres, supra note 79, at 1604. As 
Professor Gerald Torres noted, “[b]ecause most students of color in Texas tend to come from 
poor high schools, poor school districts, and poor families with less-educated providers, the 
scholarship program has successfully increased the number of African American and Mexican 
American applicants.” Id. 
 82. See Torres, supra note 79, at 1599 (“Activities like outreach, recruitment, and financial 
aid are critical to” maximizing diversity at colleges and universities.). 
 83. See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic 
Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1768 (2004) (“Affirmative action has been 
the most effective method, and generally the only effective method, of desegregating schools with 
highly selective admission standards . . . .”); Ramsey, supra note 45, at 89 (“Affirmative action has 
been demonstrated to be one of the most effective means for overcoming barriers to higher 
education that are presented by the continuing consequences of racial discrimination.”). 
 84. See James, supra note 75, at 431–32 (“The diversity rationale—the defense of affirmative 
action policies based on a compelling interest in diversity—thus justifies the use of race-conscious 
policies in pursuit of this worthy goal.”). 
 85. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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applicants,86 Justice Powell wrote separately to endorse its goal of attaining a 
diverse student body,87 which he clearly found to be “a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”88 According to Justice 
Powell, a university exercises its academic freedom, which is grounded in the 
First Amendment, when it seeks to assemble a student body comprised of 
diverse people with diverse perspectives who can contribute to the vigorous 
exchange of ideas that take place on college campuses.89 This freedom, 
however, is not limitless, and higher-education institutions must exercise it in 
a constitutionally permissible manner,90 which the Medical School failed to 
do by implementing a separate admissions procedure that included a 
prescribed number of seats in each class only for ethnic minority students.91 
In critiquing the Medical School’s program, Justice Powell outlined the 
features of a university’s admissions plan that lawfully considers race in its 
efforts to achieve the compelling interest of student-body diversity within the 
contours of strict scrutiny.92 Such features include considering race or 
ethnicity as one of a “broader array of qualifications and characteristics,”93 
individualized consideration of all applicants in comparison with each 
other,94 and no “fixed number of places to a minority group.”95 Although 
some argue that Justice Powell expressed his own views and not necessarily 
those of the Court,96 university administrators seized upon his discussion and 
modeled their own race-conscious admissions programs on his opinion.97 
Bakke’s role as a guidepost for universities seeking to diversify their student 
bodies continued for 25 years, until the Court officially sanctioned affirmative 
 
 86. Id. at 320. 
 87. Id. at 311–15. 
 88. Id. at 311–12. 
 89. Id. at 312–13. 
 90. Id. at 314 (“Although a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive 
judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights 
may not be disregarded.”). 
 91. See id. at 315; see also id. at 320 (“The fatal flaw in petitioner’s preferential program is its 
disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 92. Id. at 315–19. 
 93. Id. at 315. 
 94. Id. at 317 (“In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed 
a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison 
with all other candidates for the available seats.” (footnote omitted)). 
 95. Id. at 316. 
 96. Jurists have debated whether Justice Powell’s discussion of the diversity rationale is 
binding precedent because no other Justice joined that part of the opinion. See Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (discussing divergent cases considering this issue); Joelle A. 
Marty, Comment, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Federal Circuit Court Split Over Bakke’s 
Diversity Rationale, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 505, 508 nn.9–10 (2003) (comparing the approaches of 
different circuit courts in interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke). 
 97. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial 
Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1997); Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1859 (1996). 
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action in higher education in its companion cases of Gratz v. Bollinger98 and 
Grutter v. Bollinger99—both of which Bakke’s guiding principles heavily 
influenced.100 
In both cases, which challenged the race-conscious undergraduate and 
law school admissions policies the University of Michigan employed,101 the 
Court recognized the pursuit of “the educational benefits that flow from a 
diverse student body”102 as a compelling interest to justify considering an 
applicant’s race in admissions decisions.103 In so doing, the Court invoked 
Justice Powell’s reasoning in Bakke by acknowledging universities’ educational 
autonomy and granting them deference in their judgment that student-body 
diversity is critical to their academic mission.104 
Bakke also served as a guide for the Court as it articulated and examined 
the contours of a permissible narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions 
program. In upholding the plan in Grutter, the Court found that Michigan’s 
consideration of race as a permissible “plus factor” afforded each applicant 
the sort of individualized consideration Justice Powell had contemplated.105 
In contrast, the undergraduate admissions program that Gratz challenged—which 
automatically awarded 20 points to all minority applicants—impermissibly allowed race 
essentially to serve as the determinative criteria for admissions decisions.106 In so 
doing, the Court found that the plan conflicted with the principles that Bakke 
set forth and prevented applicants from receiving the individualized 
consideration due them under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.107 
Following Grutter, university administrators had at their disposal a new 
“touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions 
policies”108 and a model for the type of race-conscious plan that would pass 
constitutional scrutiny.109 Some institutions, such as the University of Texas, 
began to reinstitute affirmative-action programs they had previously 
 
 98. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 99. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 100. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270–75; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322–25, 333–43.  
 101. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257 (challenging the University of Michigan’s consideration of 
race in undergraduate admissions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316–17 (challenging the University of 
Michigan Law School’s consideration of race in admissions decisions). 
 102. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
 103. Id. at 325 (“endors[ing] Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling 
state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268 
(2003) (rejecting petitioners’ argument that diversity in admissions is not a compelling interest). 
 104. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29. 
 105. Id. at 334–41. 
 106. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270–75. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (referring to Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke). 
 109. See Michael A. Fletcher, Decision Means Most Colleges Will Stay Course, WASH. POST, June 
24, 2003, at A09 (describing Grutter and Gratz as “a road map for crafting affirmative action 
programs that pass constitutional muster”). 
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abandoned,110 which set the stage for yet another Supreme Court inquiry into 
their constitutionality. However, unlike the Court’s decision in Grutter that 
unquestionably endorsed the diversity-rationale tenets that Bakke set forth, the 
Court’s recent decision in Fisher I challenged and restricted Grutter’s 
guidelines for employing race-conscious admissions plans to achieve the 
benefits of diversity.111 
B. THE DEMAND FOR MORE EXACTING SCRUTINY 
In Fisher I, plaintiff Abigail Fisher filed suit against the University of Texas 
at Austin (“UT”), the state’s “flagship”112 public university,113 alleging that its 
consideration of race in admissions decisions violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.114 Both the federal district court and 
the Fifth Circuit upheld UT’s policies and practices in conducting race-
 
 110. See Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2–5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 
1:08-CV-00263-SS), 2009 WL 5055457; Press Release, The Univ. of Tex. at Austin, The University 
of Texas at Austin Reacts to the Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action Decisions (June 23, 2003), 
https://news.utexas.edu/2003/06/23/nr_affirmativeaction. Some institutions, such as Texas 
A&M University and the University of Georgia, decided not to reinstitute their affirmative action 
policies; see also Nancy G. McDuff & Halley Potter, Ensuring Diversity Under Race-Neutral Admissions 
at the University of Georgia, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER 
EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 122, 124 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 
2014); Marc Levin, Texas A&M Slaps Down Reverse Discrimination, FRONTPAGEMAG.COM (Dec. 11, 
2003), http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=15044. 
 111. See John C. Brittain, Affirmative Action Survives Again in the Supreme Court on a Legal 
Technicality: An Analysis of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 57 HOW. L.J. 963, 973–74 (2014) 
(noting that the majority in Fisher I considered parts of its strict scrutiny analysis to be “at odds 
with Grutter”); John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian, Fisher v. Texas: The Limits of Exhaustion and 
the Future of Race-Conscious University Admissions, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 904 (2014) 
(discussing “the ways in which the Fisher decision departs from precedent, proscribes new limits 
on the use of race in university admissions, and tightens requirements for narrow tailoring”); 
Fourteenth Amendment—Equal Protection Clause—Public-University Affirmative Action—Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin, 127 HARV. L. REV. 258, 263 (2013) [hereinafter Fourteenth 
Amendment] (“Thus, the means-ends distinction Justice Kennedy articulated in Fisher as 
consistent with Grutter was birthed as a critique of the Grutter majority. Whichever Justice has the 
better of the constitutional argument, there is a doctrinal shift here . . . .”). 
 112. States generally use the term “flagship” to refer to their most selective public institutions 
of higher education from a student-admissions perspective. The term here acknowledges that 
usage, but the authors make no claim beyond that. 
 113. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 
3418588, at *2 (“The University of Texas at Austin (the University) is the flagship institution of 
Texas’s public university system.”); Brief Amici Curiae of 53 Current Members of the Texas State 
Senate & House of Representatives in Support of Respondents at 1, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 
11-345), 2015 WL 6690038, at *1 (stating the same). Many people also often consider Texas 
A&M University to be one of Texas’s flagship institutions. See Brief of the American Educational 
Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 32–36, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3527825, at *24 (identifying UT and Texas A&M as Texas’s flagship 
institutions); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Black Women Lawyers Ass’n of Greater Chicago, Inc., in 
Support of Respondents at 24, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) & Gratz 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) (stating the same). 
 114. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417. 
A9_NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2017  12:01 AM 
2017] RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES 2207 
conscious admissions.115 Both lower courts held that racial diversity was a 
compelling state interest and that UT had narrowly tailored its admissions 
policies that took account of race to fit the compelling governmental interest 
of racial diversity.116 
Writing for the Court in Fisher I, Justice Anthony Kennedy began by 
affirming the holding in Bakke that achieving the educational benefits that 
flow from diverse learning environments is a compelling state interest.117 In 
doing so, however, Justice Kennedy refined and constrained the diversity 
rationale by clarifying that it is the educational benefits that flow from racial 
diversity that are the compelling governmental interest, and not racial 
diversity alone.118 The opinion characterizes racial diversity independent of 
educational benefits as “racial balancing,” which the Court clearly denounces 
as unconstitutional in this context.119 
In discussing the compelling interest it identified in Bakke and sanctioned 
in Grutter, the Fisher I Court failed to recognize important states’ interests that 
public universities further by educating students from diverse backgrounds.120 
Unlike Justice O’Connor, who broadly discussed the social, democratic, and 
educational benefits of diversity in Grutter,121 Justice Kennedy referred only to 
those diversity values realized in academic settings, such as “enhanced 
classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes” 
among students.122 “[S]tate[s’] interest[s] in debunking racial stereotypes” 
within their citizenry and “creating a racially diverse workforce for the labor 
market” are also embedded in the diversity rationale and, therefore, 
constitute broad compelling goals that go far beyond the narrow scope of 
diversity benefits Fisher I recognized.123 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy made a point of noting that justices 
“disagree[d] about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal 
protection in approving this compelling interest in diversity.”124 By 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 230–31, 247 (5th Cir. 2011), 
vacated and remanded by Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. 
Supp. 2d 587, 604, 612 (W.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded by Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 117. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417–18. 
 118. See Carla D. Pratt, The End of Indeterminacy in Affirmative Action, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 535, 
551 (2014) (“By constraining the diversity interest to only the interest in using diversity to achieve 
educational benefits, the Court has created an unnecessary disjuncture between public and 
educational interests in diversity in higher education.”). 
 119. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (quoting Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)). 
 120. See Pratt, supra note 118, at 550–52 (“[T]he state’s interest in making public-funded 
higher education equally accessible to all races or achieving racial equality in educational 
outcomes arguably would not be . . . a compelling governmental interest . . . .”). 
 121. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–33 (describing the various benefits that diversity provides to 
higher education, specifically law schools). 
 122. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418. 
 123. Pratt, supra note 118, at 549–51 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). 
 124. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
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acknowledging only the educational benefits resulting from student-body 
diversity, the Court constrained its previous articulation of the permissible 
constitutional interest at stake and, thereby, made the first prong of the strict-
scrutiny test more narrow and stringent for public universities seeking to 
assert the compelling governmental interest of diversity.125 
Fisher I also calls for stricter scrutiny than the Court relied on in Grutter 
for courts determining whether a race-conscious plan is narrowly tailored. In 
discussing a university’s pursuit of diversity’s educational benefits, Justice 
Kennedy agreed with Justice O’Connor that academic freedom provides 
colleges and universities with some latitude to determine their educational 
missions and goals.126 Therefore, “some, but not complete, judicial deference 
is proper”127 when courts decide the constitutionality of educational 
institutions’ compelling interests. 
However, in an apparent departure from Grutter,128 Fisher I made clear 
that courts should afford no such deference when they review universities’ 
chosen means by which to achieve their educational goals.129 According to the 
Court, “the [u]niversity receives no deference”130 and must convince the 
reviewing court that its use of “race to achieve the educational benefits of 
diversity” is a “necessary” endeavor.131 
The Court’s discussion of this newly articulated necessity standard 
heightens the scrutiny under which courts will adjudicate race-conscious 
admissions plans132 and, thereby, amplifies the importance of universities’ 
 
 125. See supra notes 100–07 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); see also Vinay 
Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling: Defending Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher, 
45 SETON HALL L. REV. 761, 814–16 (2015) (discussing universities’ abilities to define their 
educational goals in light of the deference that Fisher I granted to them). 
 127. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
 128. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We take the Law School at its 
word that it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will 
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”); id. at 364 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority’s broad deference to both the Law School’s judgment that racial 
aesthetics leads to educational benefits and its stubborn refusal to alter the status quo in 
admissions methods finds no basis in the Constitution or decisions of this Court.”); id. at 388 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its 
educational objective with deference to the implementation of this goal.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 
at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that Grutter held that “the narrow-
tailoring inquiry—like the compelling-interest inquiry—is undertaken with a degree of deference 
to the University’s constitutionally protected, presumably expert academic judgment”); Eboni S. 
Nelson, In Defense of Deference: The Case for Respecting Educational Autonomy and Expert Judgments in 
Fisher v. Texas, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1133, 1136 n.15 (2013) (detailing jurists’ and scholars’ 
findings that Grutter afforded deference to the Law School’s judgments regarding both its 
educational goals and the means by which to achieve them). 
 129. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Paul Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust, 59 LOY. L. REV. 489, 492 (2013) 
(noting that affirmative action “programs would face more rigorous review” under Fisher I); Eboni 
S. Nelson, Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 519, 
528–30 (2014) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the narrowly tailoring requirement 
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consideration of race-neutral alternatives as Grutter requires.133 In raising the 
constitutional bar for using race in higher-education admissions decisions, 
Fisher I mandates that, regarding race-neutral alternatives: 
Consideration by the university is of course necessary, but it is not 
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: The reviewing court must 
ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives 
would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If “a nonracial 
approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about as well 
and at tolerable administrative expense,” then the university may not 
consider race.134 
Consequently, universities seeking to produce racially diverse student bodies 
that yield educational benefits and achieve their educational goals must first 
consider135 race-neutral means for achieving such benefits and goals prior to 
resorting to using race. In light of this, examining the viability of race-neutral 
alternatives in higher-education admissions is both an important and 
necessary endeavor. 
IV. EXPERIMENTING WITH RACE NEUTRALITY 
A. THE TEXAS TEN PERCENT PLAN AS A RACE-CONSCIOUS MODEL OF RACE 
NEUTRALITY 
Texas has been a battleground state in the debate over race-conscious 
affirmative action. In the mid-1990s, a non-profit organization called the 
 
in Fisher I); Powell & Menendian, supra note 111, at 908–15 (discussing the ways in which the 
Fisher I Court created more stringent narrowly tailoring requirements for race-conscious 
admissions plans); Richard Sander & Aaron Danielson, Thinking Hard About “Race-Neutral” 
Admissions, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967, 967 (2014) (suggesting that Fisher I’s subtle differences in 
language “seem[] significantly tougher and harder to evade than the language of earlier Court 
decisions”); Robert Smith, Affirmative Action Survives Fisher (Sort of), but What About Schuette, 1 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 71–72 (2013) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Fisher I “‘tighten[s] up’ 
the level of scrutiny in Grutter”); Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 111, at 267 (concluding that Fisher I 
recalibrated Grutter’s strict scrutiny analysis of race-conscious admissions plans). 
 133. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40 (finding plans that are “narrowly tailored” should 
“require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve 
the diversity the university seeks”). 
 134. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 135. Although “consider” arguably means “try” race-neutral alternatives that could plausibly 
yield racial diversity, there does not appear to exist a consensus regarding the meaning of Grutter’s 
mandate to consider race-neutral alternatives. See, e.g., George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, 
“Serious Consideration” of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 991, 1001 
(2008) (finding the Grutter decision held that “universities must rigorously evaluate appropriate 
race-neutral policies to determine the extent to which they support the institution’s specific 
diversity goals”); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 945, 978–79 (2004) (discussing the consequences of the Grutter decision and the implications 
of the Court’s narrow tailoring standard); Powell & Menendian, supra note 111, at 908–09 
(discussing the race-neutral alternative standard set forth in Grutter and how the Fisher Court has 
seemingly made the standard more “stringent”); Michael E. Rosman, The Quixotic Search for Race-
Neutral Alternatives, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 885, 893–94 (2014) (discussing the Grutter Court’s 
problems with “percentage plans” and its rejection of other “race-neutral” plans). 
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Center for Individual Rights136 began to implement a strategy to challenge the 
consideration of race in higher-education admissions. They identified four 
law-school applicants to whom the University of Texas School of Law 
(“UTSL”) had denied admission and who were willing to serve as plaintiffs in 
litigation aimed at challenging its race-conscious affirmative-action policies 
and practices. The petitioners named Cheryl Hopwood, a white single 
mother, as the lead plaintiff, and she and the other three plaintiffs sued the 
UTSL in federal court alleging that its admissions practice of considering the 
race of applicants in making admission decisions violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.137 After losing her claim in the trial 
court, Hopwood appealed to the Fifth Circuit. In 1996, a five-judge panel 
revisited the diversity rationale the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed in Bakke and 
held that diversity in education does not serve a compelling state interest.138 
However, in holding the UTSL’s race-conscious admissions procedures 
unconstitutional, the court gratuitously suggested that a system that preferred 
the underprivileged without regard to race would be constitutional even if it 
had the effect of disproportionately aiding minorities.139 
Using the superfluous language of Hopwood as guidance, the Texas 
legislature responded to the Fifth Circuit’s decision by adopting the Top Ten 
Percent Plan (“Plan”).140 The Plan was race-conscious in that the legislators 
who adopted it were aware that its design would leverage existing de facto 
segregation in public schools and yield racial diversity in the students 
admitted to the University of Texas and all public universities in the state.141 
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood opened the door and the majority 
in Fisher I implied the Plan was race-neutral because, by its terms, it did not 
distinguish between applicants on the basis of race, and it specifically 
precluded public universities in Texas from doing so.142 By leveraging the 
 
 136. CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS., https://www.cir-usa.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
 137. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938, 946 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The law school operated an 
admissions program in which it evaluated each applicant based on his or her “Texas Index 
number,” a mathematical composite of UGPA and LSAT score. Id. at 935. Based on this score, it 
deemed an applicant either a “presumptive admit,” “presumptive deny,” or “discretionary” 
candidate for admission. Id. The ranges of scores established for placing minority applicants in 
each of these categories were lower than the ranges of scores fixed for non-minorities, such that 
the school could assign a white applicant and a black applicant with the same composite score to 
different categories. Id. at 936–37. For example, it could assign a white applicant with a composite 
score of X to the presumptive deny category, while it could assign a black applicant with that same 
composite score to the presumptive admit category. Id. 
 138. Id. at 934; see also Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action 
in the Education Arena, 42 HOW. L.J. 451, 457–58 (1999). 
 139. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946. 
 140. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2016). See also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of 
Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 290 (2001); Leslie 
Yalof Garfield, The Paradox of Race-Conscious Labels, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1523, 1529–31 (2014). 
 141. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting) (citing HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, HB 588 4–5 (1997), http://www.lrl.state.tx. 
us/scanned/hroBillAnalyses/75-0/HB588.PDF). 
 142. Id. at 2415–16. 
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neighborhood segregation of Texas cities and the resulting de facto143 
segregation in Texas public schools that the neighborhood segregation 
generated, the Plan extended admission to elite Texas public universities to 
many students who otherwise would have been unable to compete for 
admission because they had received an inferior education in the K–12 
segment of the public education pipeline.144 
From 1997 to 2004, the Plan operated as the primary means by which 
public institutions of higher education in Texas could diversify their student 
bodies.145 Universities continued to read applications of prospective students 
to determine whether applicants had unique talents or attributes to 
contribute to the diversity of the school, such as athletic ability, musical or 
artistic talent, or a unique geographical background, but they did not 
consider race in their admissions processes during this period.146 However, 
the Supreme Court decided Grutter in 2003, which overruled the decision in 
Hopwood that had deemed unconstitutional all race-conscious affirmative 
action in higher-education institutions located in the Fifth Circuit.147 
Consequently, in 2004, the University of Texas began using a hybrid 
admissions system that admitted the bulk of students in accordance with the 
Plan, but admitted the remainder of students through a holistic review of 
individual applicants that considered various identity factors including 
race.148 The Fisher I plaintiffs subsequently challenged this two-prong 
approach by arguing that the race-conscious prong of the UT’s admissions 
 
 143. Unlike de jure segregation, which laws impose, de facto racial segregation occurs in 
public schools because of racially segregated housing patterns that emerged during the Jim Crow 
era and persist today. Consequently, Texas is not alone in having de facto segregation as a 
contemporary vestige of de jure segregation. See Maurice C. Daniels & Cameron Van Patterson, 
(Re)considering Race in the Desegregation of Higher Education, 46 GA. L. REV. 521, 544 n.119 (2012) 
(“[R]acial segregation in schools is a function of residential segregation, which is inextricably 
linked to socioeconomic inequalities that are related to the legacy of Jim Crow laws, policies, and 
practices.”); Lino A. Graglia, Solving the Parents Involved Paradox, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 913 
n.15 (2008) (explaining the distinction between de jure and de facto race segregation). See also 
generally SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE, NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA (2014) 
(offering a way forward that seeks to address the inferior education caused by racially segregated 
housing patterns, and arguing that using place instead of race in diversity programming will 
better amend the structural disadvantages endured by many children of color, while enhancing 
the possibility that society move past the racial resentment that affirmative action engenders). 
 144. See Preston Green, Affirmative Action: A Tool for Rebuilding the K–12 Segment of the Pipeline, 
in THE END OF THE PIPELINE: A JOURNEY OF RECOGNITION FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS ENTERING THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 139, 139–50 (Dorothy H. Evensen & Carla D. Pratt eds., 2012) (pointing out 
that the reason we continue to need race-conscious affirmative action is because states have not 
fulfilled the promise of Brown and relegate so many children of color to racially segregated, 
underfunded, inferior schools for their primary and secondary educations). 
 145. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 654 n.121 (5th Cir. 2014).  
 146. Garfield, supra note 140, at 1531. 
 147. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (abrogating Hopwood by allowing the 
limited use of race considerations for admissions decisions). The Court also decided Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251, 255–57 (2003), which struck down an affirmative action policy and 
procedure applied to undergraduate admissions because it assigned points to individuals from 
certain racial groups rather than conducting an individualized holistic review of each applicant. 
 148. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 637–38.  
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policy was not necessary to achieve student-body diversity because the “race-
neutral” Plan achieved the goal of racial diversity without resorting to 
considering any applicant’s race.149 
A Supreme Court majority in Fisher I viewed the Plan as race neutral 
because it operated without the UT considering the race of applicants who 
graduated in the top 10% of their high-school classes. In her dissent, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg essentially called the majority’s characterization of the 
Plan as race-neutral a legal fiction. She asserted that the Plan was race-
conscious because the Texas Legislature had adopted it knowing that it would 
operate to admit a racially diverse group of Texas high school graduates to 
the UT and other public colleges in Texas.150 In the Gratz case involving 
undergraduate admissions at the University of Michigan, Justice Ginsberg 
stated in her dissent that “‘percentage plans’ are just as race conscious as the 
point scheme [used by Michigan for undergraduate admissions because] they 
get their racially diverse results without saying directly what they are doing or 
why they are doing it.”151 
Justice Ginsburg’s point could come back to haunt proponents of the 
Plan because facial neutrality of a law is insufficient to render it constitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Pursuant to the constitutional principle 
of separation of powers, the judicial branch of government should give 
substantial deference to legislative and executive action. Consequently, laws 
the legislative branch enacts will receive a low level of judicial scrutiny unless 
they draw distinctions based on a suspect classification such as race or sex. 
Rational-basis review is the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny.152 It is 
the standard courts default to when reviewing government action.153 Unless 
the challenged action triggers heightened scrutiny by drawing distinctions 
based on a suspect classification, or infringing on a fundamental right, the 
court will apply the rational basis test to determine constitutionality.154 Under 
rational-basis review, courts will uphold a law as long as it is rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpose.155 Courts will subject a challenged 
facially neutral law156 that has a disparate impact on a racial group to rational-
basis review unless it imposes a discriminatory impact on that group157 and 
 
 149. Id. at 644. 
 150. As Justice Ginsberg acknowledged, “Only an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral 
alternatives [referring to the Ten Percent Plan] as race unconscious.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 151. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 152. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 694 (4th ed. 2011).  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (“[W]e have long recognized that a 
legitimate and rational goal of price or rate regulation is the protection of consumer welfare.”). 
 156. A facially neutral law is one that says nothing about race or any suspect classification in 
the text of the law. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999). 
 157. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 222 (1971). 
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has a discriminatory purpose.158 Under the rational-basis test, a court could 
hold the Plan to be constitutional because it is rationally related to the 
legitimate state goal of achieving racial and geographic diversity in Texas 
public higher education. 
However, a reviewing court could decide that the Plan triggers strict 
scrutiny because it arguably has both a discriminatory impact and a 
discriminatory purpose. A court could hold that the Plan imposes a 
discriminatory impact on white applicants to Texas colleges by displacing 
those who have higher SAT and ACT scores than the students of color 
graduating from predominately black or Latina/o high schools who the Plan 
admits instead by privileging their high school GPA. A court could also hold 
that the Texas legislature had a discriminatory purpose when it enacted the 
law because the legislature’s clear intent was to achieve both racial and 
geographic diversity in Texas public colleges and universities by excluding a 
significant portion of white applicants whom the elite public universities may 
otherwise admit. To act with a discriminatory purpose, the legislature must do 
more than merely know about the discriminatory impact of its law at the time 
of enactment. Instead, a court must find that the legislative body enacted the 
law “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group.”159 A court could find that the Texas legislature 
adopted the law not merely in spite of its adverse effect on white high school 
students, but because it would adversely affect them by excluding a significant 
portion of them from admission at elite colleges. 
Despite this vulnerability to characterization as a “racial classification” 
under equal-protection jurisprudence, the Court has consistently accepted 
the Plan as a constitutional race-neutral classification that is reviewed 
pursuant to the rational-basis test. Hence, although a completely colorblind 
legislature did not enact the Plan, and it is arguably race-conscious because 
legislators were conscious of its racial implications when it was adopted, it 
remains a race-neutral classification for purposes of equal-protection law. 
The Plan’s relatively secure status as race-neutral legislation paves the way 
for colleges and universities to experiment with race-neutral admissions 
policies that are conscious of their impact on racial diversity. The next 
Subpart explores how law schools might exploit this constitutional permission 
to experiment with race-neutral measures that are conscious of racial impact 
in their efforts to assemble a diverse study body and comply with Fisher I. 
B. USING RACE-NEUTRAL CRITERIA IN LAW-SCHOOL ADMISSIONS TO ACHIEVE 
RACIAL DIVERSITY 
For law schools that interpret the mandate to consider race neutral 
alternatives as more than a mandate to think about it, the findings of our study 
offer one method to test the viability of race neutrality in law school 
admissions. To be clear, the findings from this study do not prove that law 
 
 158. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). 
 159. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
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schools can achieve a critical mass of students from underrepresented groups 
using race neutral admission policies. Instead, the findings from this study 
equip law schools with data that can be used to test the viability of race neutral 
admissions in a particular law school context.  
1. Law Schools Have a Unique Opportunity to Experiment with Race 
Neutrality 
Researchers have conducted several studies to determine whether the 
socioeconomic status of a college applicant, determined by household 
income of his or her parents, could potentially benefit universities seeking to 
achieve both economic and racial diversity if they weigh it as a factor in their 
admissions processes. Proponents of this form of wealth-based affirmative 
action view it as fairer than race-conscious affirmative action because it does 
not draw distinctions between people based on the practice of classifying 
them by race, and it would help the people whom they perceive as needing 
and deserving the benefit of affirmative action get into elite colleges. 
Proponents of class-based affirmative action argue that race-conscious 
affirmative action benefits primarily affluent privileged blacks and other 
privileged racial minorities while helping only a few poor racial minorities.160 
They frequently reference Barack and Michelle Obama’s daughters as the 
exemplar of affluent blacks who do not need or deserve any form of race-
conscious affirmative action to get into college.161 
This critique of race-conscious affirmative action argues that it is unfair 
to have a policy aimed at benefitting affluent and already privileged 
individuals from certain racial minority groups over the underprivileged 
members of all races.162 Indeed, when educational institutions first 
implemented race-conscious affirmative action in the 1960s, the primary 
beneficiaries were African–Americans who were the first in their families to 
attend college163 and whose parents had endured segregation laws and other 
forms of purposeful discrimination trampling asunder their own educational 
and employment goals. The current generation of college applicants contains 
the children and grandchildren of the first-generation beneficiaries of 
affirmative action, affording many of them two college-educated parents and 
 
 160. See generally Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939 (1997); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 161. This argument ignores the reality that children from politically powerful and wealthy 
families have other forms of affirmative action to help them get into the colleges of their choice, 
such as receiving a legacy preference due to their parents having attended the school or a donor 
preference due to their parents’ financial contributions to the school. When ABC’s George 
Stephanopoulos asked President Obama whether his “daughters deserved affirmative action in 
college admissions, Obama replied that” they didn’t and asserted that “his daughters should ‘be 
treated by any admissions officer as folks who are pretty advantaged.’” Richard Kahlenberg, The 
Affirmative Action Trap, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 1, 2010), http://prospect.org/article/affirmative-
action-trap-0. 
 162. See Malamud, supra note 160, at 988–96 (discussing the continued need for affirmation 
action to help those within the black middle class). 
 163. RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS 
STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 28 (2012). 
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elite academic preparation at the primary and secondary level.164 Moreover, 
with the legalization of interracial marriage in 1967,165 many applicants who 
check the “black box” and receive consideration as people who would 
increase racial diversity are biracial Americans who have, to some extent, 
enjoyed the benefits of white privilege.166 Conversely, some proponents of 
affirmative action criticize the way educational institutions implement race-
conscious affirmative action because they believe it has become dislodged 
from its historical moorings of seeking to redress past racial injustice against 
African–Americans. They point to the fact that a significant percentage of 
applicants benefitting from race-conscious affirmative action at elite public 
universities are foreign-born blacks who did not suffer the intergenerational 
harms of slavery and Jim Crow, and arguably displace African–Americans 
from educational opportunities.167 Thus, opponents and proponents of race-
conscious affirmative action advocate for its abandonment or retooling so that 
it benefits more economically disadvantaged students. Underperforming 
public primary and secondary schools are more likely to educate students 
from low-income households, which leaves these students underprepared to 
perform well on college entrance exams.168 As a result, standardized test 
scores on the SAT and ACT correlate, with statistical significance, to the 
socioeconomic status of high-school student applicants to college.169 
Consequently, students from low-income families are more likely to score 
lower than what is necessary to compete for and secure a place in the entering 
class at many elite public colleges. At Michigan, for example, only 13% of the 
undergraduate population received Pell Grants170 from the federal 
government. Because the government awards these grants only to 
undergraduate students from low-income families171 they serve as a good 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 166. See Brown & Bell, supra note 45, at 1245–54; see also infra note 187. For an understanding 
of white privilege, see Peggy McIntosh’s groundbreaking essay identifying the various ways that 
her whiteness operates to privilege her in daily life such as being able to walk into any hair salon 
and find a hair stylist who can deal with her hair and being able to shop alone without store 
personnel following or harassing her. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal 
Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND 
LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 25–27 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995). For more 
on white privilege, see PAULA S. ROTHENBERG, WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON THE 
OTHER SIDE OF RACISM 95–119 (2005). 
 167. See, e.g., Brown & Bell, supra note 45, at 1249–54; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 45, at 
1145–56. 
 168. See Green, supra note 144, at 139–40. 
 169. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY: DEMOCRATIZING HIGHER EDUCATION 
IN AMERICA 52 (2015); LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 68 (2002). 
 170. ELLEN BERREY, THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND THE LIMITS OF 
RACIAL JUSTICE 96 (2015). 
 171. Most students receiving a Pell Grant are from families earning less than $80,000 per year. See 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM ANNUAL DATA REPORTS (2014–2015), 
https://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2014-15/pell-eoy-2014-15.html (listing the 
number of recipients each year by income bracket). 
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indicator of the economic diversity in the student body of an undergraduate 
institution. Because economically disadvantaged students have a clear need 
not only in the financial arena but also in finding opportunities to attend elite 
colleges, opponents of race-conscious affirmative action have a persuasive 
argument for restructuring affirmative action to benefit this group.  
Opponents of class-based affirmative action see this type of reform as a 
means of excluding more racial minorities from elite higher education. 
Because there are so many more poor whites than poor minorities in the 
United States, and because the size of a class-based preference in admissions 
at elite schools would have to be very large to yield admission of low income 
minority students, prior studies on the use of class-based affirmative action 
suggest that this approach may result in fewer racial minorities attending elite 
colleges and lower academic credentials of admitted students.172 Despite these 
concerns, considering students’ socioeconomic status in admissions decisions 
has contributed to racial diversity on college campuses, albeit not to the same 
extent as race-conscious measures.173 Because a disproportionate number of 
students of color come from low-income households, this race-neutral 
approach to affirmative action is still race-conscious, and law schools can use 
it to create racially diverse student bodies.  
Like other scholars who have examined the Equal Protection Clause in 
the educational context, we see it as having the anti-subordination purpose of 
eliminating racial caste.174 An affirmative-action policy that perpetuates the 
existing stratification of racial minorities in law school by relegating the 
overwhelming majority of them to less prestigious institutions would serve to 
entrench white racial dominance in the legal profession further. Ignoring 
race in law-school admissions altogether would likely have this effect and fail 
to preserve the anti-subordination principle embedded in the Equal 
Protection Clause. We assert that affirmative action in the law-school context 
can be both race-blind and race-conscious, much like the Texas Ten Percent 
Plan. Some law schools may be able to abandon the use of race in their 
admissions and continue to yield a critical mass of racial diversity by using 
socioeconomic questions that align closely with the racial diversity they seek 
 
 172. See generally Ben Backes, Do Affirmative Action Bans Lower Minority College Enrollment and 
Attainment?: Evidence from Statewide Bans, 47 J. HUM. RESOURCES 435 (2012) (finding that after 
statewide bans on considering race in college admissions, black and Hispanic enrollment 
dropped at the top institutions in those states); Mark C. Long, Is There a “Workable” Race-Neutral 
Alternative to Affirmative Action in College Admissions?, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 162 (2015) 
(asserting that in the college admissions context, “a system that uses an applicant’s predicted 
likelihood of being an underrepresented racial minority as a proxy for the applicant’s actual 
minority status can yield an admitted class [with] a lower predicted [GPA]” than the class would 
have had if race had been considered in the admissions process). 
 173. See Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the 
War?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 41 (2005) (“[C]ollege and university consideration of applicants’ 
socioeconomic background has helped to increase their diversity levels.”).  
 174. Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations and Legislative Opportunities, 
7 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 213, 213–14 (2011) (noting that the Court in Parents Involved 
embraced an anti-subordination definition of the equal protection clause and found that the 
elimination of racial isolation in public schools was a compelling governmental interest). 
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to achieve. In so doing, they may be able to disprove the class-versus-race 
dichotomy in affirmative action by asking applicants socioeconomic related 
questions about their identity in lieu of asking their race and then weighting 
the application of students who fit an established socioeconomic profile. 
For example, our study found that African–American students were the 
most likely to provide uncompensated service to racial groups that are 
underserved by the legal profession. Because law schools should want to do 
their part in closing the access-to-justice gap, they could appropriately weight 
the applications of applicants who provide documentation of uncompensated 
service to racial groups that the legal profession underserves. Our study 
suggests that redefining merit in this way would benefit African–American 
applicants to law school and possibly help law schools matriculate more 
African–American students than asking applicants about their race. Asking 
applicants to report this type of service would also send a message that the 
schools value it and incentivize others to perform service to these groups.  
Law school is a uniquely fertile testing ground for this type of 
experimentation because, unlike an undergraduate school where applicants 
could game the system by answering questions on an admissions application 
in a way that they think will curry favor, law-school applicants must be truthful 
on their applications. This is partly because they are applying to become part 
of a profession that highly values ethics,175 but also because the Bar authorities 
subsequently verify the answers on their application when they apply to take 
the Bar examination. We set out to explore what set of race-neutral 
socioeconomic questions law schools could ask on the application, in lieu of 
race, that might yield significant racial diversity in their student bodies.176 We 
also sought to explore, briefly, whether racial diversity in law school 
classrooms brought different viewpoints to law school classrooms.  
 
 175. The Bar expects high moral character of all persons seeking admission. For a discussion 
of moral character as a professional credential, see Carla D. Pratt, Should Klansmen Be Lawyers?: 
Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 857, 864–67 (2003); and 
Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 507–08 (1985). 
 176. We recognize that there will be differing views among faculty members in law schools 
regarding the proper approach to take to enrolling a diverse class. Some law school deans and 
faculty members want to move away from considering race in admissions in an effort to insulate 
their schools from legal challenges; others want to use race-blind admission because they object 
to racial consideration as improper. Other law school deans and faculty members will want to 
continue to use race to achieve a racially diverse class. We anticipate that law schools might 
experience some interest convergence among faculty members with differing views. Faculty 
members on both sides of the affirmative-action equation may decide to use our study to test the 
viability of race-blind admissions, but for different reasons. Faculty members who are opposed to 
the use of race might opt for trying a race-blind admission cycle hoping to move the institution 
away from racial consideration, whereas those who favor using race in admissions might opt for 
trying a race-blind admission cycle in order to obtain evidence that shows that it is not as effective 
in achieving a racially diverse student body as the consideration of race, or in order to 
demonstrate compliance with Fisher I. 
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2. Study Design 
This study sought to determine race-neutral identity factors that align 
closely with the socially mapped racial groups that enter law schools each year. 
We sought to design a study that would inform the law-school admissions 
process and help law schools test whether they could seat a racially diverse 
student body without asking applicants about their race. The ability to seat a 
racially diverse student body without asking about race is important for three 
reasons. First, having a race-blind tool to help identify students who will 
contribute to student-body diversity is essential for law schools operating in 
jurisdictions that ban racial consideration in higher education admissions 
decisions.177 Second, having a race-blind tool is helpful to law schools in 
jurisdictions that do allow racial consideration in law school admissions 
because identifying race-neutral identity factors that law schools can ask about 
on their applications provides them with a means178 to “consider” race-blind 
admissions as Fisher I requires.179 Our study will provide useful information to 
law schools that may be interested in experimenting with a race-blind 
admission cycle in an effort to determine whether the school could yield a 
critical mass of racial minority students if it moved to a race-neutral admissions 
process. Finally, with the continued constitutional attacks on race-conscious 
admissions practices, a race-neutral admissions tool may become a necessity 
for all law schools seeking to seat a diverse student body if the Supreme Court 
restricts the use of race in higher-education admissions in the future.180We 
were the investigators in the study. We are wholly responsible for the study’s 
design and implementation. We collectively designed the survey instrument 
that study participants completed181 by first conducting a literature review to 
determine the social and economic aspects of life that disproportionately 
impact people of color. We used that literature to develop survey questions 
related to personal identity.182 For example, the literature on education shows 
 
 177. Presently, eight states ban race-conscious affirmative action in higher-education 
admission: Florida, New Hampshire, California, Washington, Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, and 
Oklahoma. See Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx. 
 178. We do not assert that our study is the only means by which a law school could 
experiment with the viability of race-neutral admissions. We assert that it is merely one way that 
law schools can fulfill the mandate of Fisher I, which is to consider race-neutral alternatives to 
asking applicants to identify their race in the admissions application process. 
 179. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
 180. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 181. See Appendix A. 
 182. REBECCA GOLDRING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM 
THE 2011–12 SCHOOLS AND STAFFING SURVEY (2013) https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013314.pdf 
(Survey Question B-1). We have known since at least 1978 that the racial composition of high schools 
impacts college attendance and test performance. See ROBERT L. CRAIN & RITA E. MAHARD, RAND 
CORP., THE INFLUENCE OF HIGH SCHOOL RACIAL COMPOSITION ON BLACK COLLEGE ATTENDANCE AND 
TEST PERFORMANCE (1978), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs78/78212.pdf (Survey Question B-2; a national 
longitudinal study); see also Discrimination in Education, 85th Session of the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Geneva (Aug. 2014) (documenting the continued 
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racial subordination of children of color who are victims of de facto racial segregation in public 
education); KATHERINE RALSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH 
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, TRENDS, AND ISSUES (2008) (Survey Question B-3).  
Eligibility for the free and reduced-price lunch program is often used as a proxy 
measure of family income . . . . Overall, 41 percent of 4th-graders were eligible for 
free or reduced-price lunches in 2005. White 4th-graders had the lowest percentage 
of eligible students (24 percent). The percentages of Black and Hispanic 4th-graders 
(70 and 73 percent) who were eligible were three times the percentages of White 
4th-graders who were eligible, and the percentage of American Indian/Alaska 
Native 4th-graders (65 percent) who were eligible was nearly three times that of 
Whites. Asians/Pacific Islanders also had a higher percentage (33 percent) of 
eligible students than did Whites, but a lower percentage than did Blacks, Hispanics, 
or American Indians/Alaska Natives. 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Minorities: 
Indicator 7: Elementary and Secondary Enrollment (Sept. 2007) (citation omitted), https://nces.ed.gov/ 
pubs2007/minoritytrends/ind_2_7.asp; Teresa L. Morisi, Youth Enrollment and Employment During the 
School Year, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 51, 58 (2008) (Survey Question B-4); see also generally CHILD TRENDS 
DATABANK, YOUTH EMPLOYMENT: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, http://www.childtrends.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/05/120_Youth_Employment.pdf (last updated Dec. 2015). As recent as 
the 2013–14 school year, only 73 percent of black public high school students and 76 percent of 
Hispanic public high school students graduated on time with a regular diploma. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, The Condition of Education: Public High School Graduation Rates (last updated May 2016), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_coi.asp (Survey Question B-5). This achievement gap 
has existed for decades, which suggests that minority law school applicants and law students who are 
from black and/or Hispanic households are more likely to have parents who did not complete high 
school. Id.; XIAOJIE LI, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINORITY-SERVING 
INSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY UNDERGRADUATES ENROLLED IN THESE INSTITUTIONS: POSTSECONDARY 
EDUCATION DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS REPORT 38 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008156.pdf 
(Survey Question B-6). Oliver and Shapiro document the wealth gap between black and white families 
and the primary causes for that gap. They point out that black families earn lower incomes and suffer 
higher unemployment rates, which suggests that black law-school applicants and black law students 
may have had to work for money in college more than non-black college students. MELVIN L. OLIVER 
& THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 
(1995) (Survey Question B-7) [hereinafter BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH]. Evensen and Pratt found 
that black law students reported having to work for money to get through college and law school. See 
generally Green, supra note 144 (Survey Question B-8); see also generally MARK KANTROWITZ, STUDENT 
AID POLICY ANALYSIS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRANTS AND SCHOLARSHIPS BY RACE (2011). Susan P. Choy, 
Students Whose Parents Did Not Go to College: Postsecondary Access, Persistence, and Attainment, in THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 6 (2001) (Survey Question B-9); see generally Green, supra note 144 (Survey 
Question B-10; suggesting that many black law students are the first in their immediate family to attend 
law school, and many black law-student participants in the study reported not even knowing a black 
lawyer before going to law school). See Carla D. Pratt, Way to Represent: The Role of Black Lawyers in 
Contemporary American Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1409, 1431 (2009) (Survey Question B-11; 
noting that black culture socializes people to have a sense of responsibility to give back to their black 
communities, which is why many black lawyers devote their philanthropic efforts toward the less 
fortunate living in black communities). KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., CHILDREN IN SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 
BY RACE, http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/107-children-in-single-parent-families-by-
race?loc=1&loct=1#detailed/1/any/false/869,36,868,867,133/10,11,9,12,1,185,13/432,431 (last 
updated Jan. 2017) (Survey Question C-1). ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2009: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES ( 2011) (Survey Question 
C-2). Teresa Wiltz, Racial and Ethnic Disparities Persist in Teen Pregnancy Rates, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: 
STATELINE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/ 
2015/3/03/racial-and-ethnic-disparities-persist-in-teen-pregnancy-rates (Survey Question C-3). 
SHELLEY K. IRVING & TRACY A. LOVELESS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING: 
PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, 2009–2012: WHO GETS ASSISTANCE?: HOUSEHOLD 
ECONOMIC STUDIES (2015) (Survey Question C-4). Oliver and Shapiro, in their study of white family 
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that a large portion of children of color are educated in the public-school 
system.183 Consequently, we formulated identity-related questions about the 
 
wealth and black family wealth, have consistently documented that annual household income for black 
families is on average less than annual household income for white families. Consequently, we 
anticipated that family income for black, Native American and Hispanic law-school applicants might 
be considerably less than family income for whites. See BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH, supra (Survey 
Question C-5). We asked about family income while study participants were in high school because 
family income at that time likely would influence the trajectory of the students’ education, including 
where they went to college. Because mass incarceration has had a disparate impact on people of color, 
we asked about incarceration. We limited the question to immediate family out of fear that the broad 
sweep of mass incarceration may have touched every American family at some level. See generally 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
(2010) (Survey Questions C-6 and C-7). We asked if students were raised in households that spoke a 
language other than English, rather than ask about language fluency, because we anticipated that 
asking about language fluency would capture students who learned another language without a 
cultural connection to that language and would miss students who had a cultural connection to a 
language other than English, but whose parents did not teach it to them in an effort to protect them 
from racial and ethnic discrimination by whites. Available statistics show that “[t]he percentage of 
public school students in the United States who were English language learners was higher in school 
year 2013–43 (9.3 percent, or an estimated 4.5 million students) than in 2003–04 (8.8 percent, or an 
estimated 4.2 million students) and in 2012–13 (9.2 percent, or an estimated 4.4 million students).” 
Fast Facts: English Language Learners, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/ 
display.asp?id=96 (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (Survey Question C-8). Religious Landscape Study: Racial 
and Ethnic Composition, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/racial-
and-ethnic-composition (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (Survey Question C-9). We were cognizant of the 
fact that the places where students come from often help determine their opportunities, so we asked 
students to disclose this information. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE 
AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 3–4 (2004). See generally CASHIN, supra note 145 
(Survey Question C-10; arguing that affirmative action should move away from race and toward “place” 
to locate its intended beneficiaries). KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., Children Living in Areas of Concentrated 
Poverty by Race and Ethnicity, http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/7753-children-living-in-
areas-of-concentrated-poverty-by-race-and-ethnicity?loc=1&loct=1#detailed/1/any/false/1485,1376,1 
201,1074,880/10,11,9,12,1,185,13/14943,14942 (last updated Jan. 2017) (Survey Question C-11). 
Questions were added to assess the views of student participants regarding the importance of diversity 
in the classroom. While the Supreme Court and various educators have asserted the importance of 
diversity, we wanted to take this opportunity to get the opinion of the people who were experience 
education in law school classrooms. Since the goal of the study is to provide law schools with tools for 
achieving diversity in law school classrooms, we thought the survey was a good opportunity to assess the 
students’ views about the importance of diversity in the law school classroom. Some of the questions 
eliminate “race” from the diversity calculus in an effort to identify whether law students value race-
neutral forms of diversity over racial diversity. We know from existing literature that the general 
population has different views about race-based affirmative action with blacks favoring it at a much 
higher rate than whites, but we were not sure whether this racial dichotomy of viewpoint would hold 
up in the “diversity in law school” context. Conflicted Views of Affirmative Action: Summary of Findings, PEW 
RES. CTR. (May 14, 2003), http://www.people-press.org/2003/05/14/conflicted-views-of-affirmative-
action (Survey Questions D-1 through D-4). 
 183. “Black students are six times more likely to attend high-poverty” low-performing public 
schools with 45% of black students attending these schools compared to only 7% of white students. 
Tanvi Misra, The Stark Inequality of U.S. Public Schools, Mapped, CITYLAB (May 14, 2015), 
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/05/the-stark-inequality-of-us-public-schools-mapped/393 
095. U.S. Department of Education data show that non-white school aged children attending private 
schools is around 30% of the overall private school population and 69.6% of school aged children 
in private schools are white. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2017). Moreover, the National Center for Education Statistics reports:  
From fall 2003 through fall 2013, the number of White students enrolled in public 
elementary and secondary schools decreased from 28.4 million to 25.2 million, and 
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nature of the K–12 education that student participants received. The 
literature we relied upon to develop the survey questions focused on studies 
involving the general population. As a result, we were not sure whether the 
findings of this literature were transferrable to a relatively privileged subset of 
the general population, such as law students.184 Administering the survey to 
first-year law students will inform our understanding of whether there are 
social identity factors that align more closely with law students of certain racial 
groups. 
Our construction of the survey instrument was also informed by the 
theory of intersectionality.185 The theory of intersectionality originates from 
critical-race theory and posits that some individuals reside at the intersection 
of more than one subordinated identity.186 A black woman, for example, exists 
at the intersection of her subordinated racial identity and her subordinated 
gender identity. Her experience as a person whose identity exists at the 
intersection of two subordinated identity factors is therefore different from a 
white woman’s experience who endures subordination of her gender identity 
but enjoys the benefits of racial privilege. Just as an individual may have an 
identity that exists at the intersection of more than one subordinated identity, 
there may be certain social identity factors that intersect with one another 
more often than others. In other words, the theory of intersectionality alerted 
us to the possibility that a cluster of identity factors that align with a particular 
race more closely than other races may exist. Through analysis of the survey 
data, we seek to identify which identity factors individually align closely with 
each racial group. We also seek to understand and identify whether there are 
 
the percentage of students who were White decreased from 59 to 50 percent. In 
contrast, the number of Hispanic students enrolled during this period increased 
from 9.0 million to 12.5 million, and the percentage who were Hispanic increased 
from 19 to 25 percent. The number of Black students enrolled decreased from 8.3 
million to 7.8 million, and the percentage who were Black decreased from 17 to 16 
percent. Since fall 2002, the percentage of students enrolled in public schools who 
were Hispanic has exceeded the percentage who were Black. Additionally, the 
number of American Indian/Alaska Native students enrolled from fall 2003 to fall 
2013 decreased from 0.6 million to 0.5 million, and the percentage who were 
American Indian/Alaska Native remained around 1 percent. The number of White 
students enrolled in public schools is projected to continue decreasing between fall 
2014 and fall 2025 (from 25.0 million to 23.5 million) and to account for 46 percent 
of total enrollment in 2025. 
Racial/Ethnic Enrollment in Public Schools, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/coe/indicator_cge.asp (last updated May 2016).  
 184. Law students are a privileged group in that they generally have achieved at least a 
bachelor’s degree and have demonstrated academic and non-academic achievements that earn 
them admission to law school. In the 2014–15 academic year, there were 54,467 applicants to ABA 
approved U.S. law schools and only 35,726 of those applicants matriculated to law school. LAW 
SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, US NATIONAL DECISION PROFILES–FALL TERM 2014–2015 
APPLICATION YEAR SUMMARY (2016), http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/data-(members)/ 
national-decision-profiles-fall-2015.pdf. 
 185. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, in CRITICAL 
RACE FEMINISM: A READER 23 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
 186. Id. 
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individual identity factors that intersect in a meaningful way to bring the 
relationship with a particular racial group even closer to that particular 
identity factor. If certain identity factors intersect in a way to heighten their 
relationship to a particular racial group, law schools could potentially use that 
subset of identity related questions on their applications to conduct race-blind 
admissions that yield a critical mass of students from racial groups that are 
underrepresented in law schools and the legal profession. 
In addition to questions related to identity, the survey also contains four 
questions related to viewpoint. Law schools seeking to conduct race-blind 
admissions could not use these opinion-based questions in their applications 
because applicants would likely proffer answers that they think the law school 
would value since opinions are not facts that can be verified by bar authorities. 
Consequently, we added these questions to the survey to help law schools 
understand the perceived value of diversity in their individual institutions and 
whether minority students bring viewpoints to their classrooms that differ 
significantly from viewpoints of white students. We framed the four questions 
in the context of diversity in an effort to determine whether students value a 
diverse learning environment and whether there are differences in student 
views that align with race. 
Overall, this study is exploratory in nature; thus, we do not posit any 
specific research hypotheses. We do, however, examine this research 
question: Is there a relationship between law-school students’ racial/ethnic background 
and their reported identification with race-neutral identity factors? 
3. Data Collection 
We restricted data collection to first-year law students enrolled at public 
ABA approved law schools in jurisdictions that presently permit race-
conscious affirmative action in higher education. We restricted the study to 
first-year students who have matriculated to law school because they provide 
the most recent example of students willing to attend law school in general 
and the law school that enrolled them in particular. We considered, but 
rejected, a study design surveying applicants to law schools because applicants 
would be harder to reach and many applicants overlap with multiple law 
schools, so using matriculants instead of applicants avoids the problem of 
inviting the same applicant to complete the survey more than once. Because 
we administered the survey to anonymous participants, if we surveyed 
applicants instead of matriculants we would have had no reliable means of 
protecting against duplication in the completion of the survey. 
We restricted participation to public law schools in jurisdictions that 
permit racial consideration in admissions because we anticipated that law 
schools in those jurisdictions would be more likely to have more diversity in 
their student body and specifically more students of color. Public law schools 
in jurisdictions that permit racial consideration in law school admissions are 
also more vulnerable to suit by a challenger if they employ race-conscious 
affirmative action. Consequently, we thought this group of law schools could 
benefit from their students’ participation in the study. 
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We sought to administer the survey to law students at a cross-section of 
public ABA approved U.S. law schools. We identified this cross-section by 
considering the geographical region of the United States where the law school 
is located, the campus setting in which it is situated (such as urban, suburban 
or rural), its size, and its U.S. News & World Report ranking. We used these law-
school identity factors to ensure that the study would capture a diverse group 
of law schools because we recognized that student social and economic 
identity factors may present and operate differently at a top-ranked urban law 
school than at a lower-ranked law school in a rural setting. 
To secure participating schools, our research team sent an invitation 
letter to the dean at each public ABA approved law school inviting them to 
have their law school participate in the study. After securing the commitment 
of several deans, we followed up with individual deans at law schools that 
would help us meet the cross-section requirements identified above. We 
sought to have between 10 and 12 law schools in our sample so that, with an 
average of 100 student participants per law school, we would have a dataset 
with approximately 1,000 survey participants if we had a high participation 
rate among students. To avoid conflict of interest issues, we rejected the idea 
of a financial incentive to induce a high participation rate of students at each 
law school and instead asked deans to permit us to administer the survey 
during a time when the first-year class convened for some other purpose, such 
as orientation, a speaker, or a course. This proved to be a successful method 
for achieving a high participation rate (88%) among first year students at 
participating law schools. 
This study’s design is not without limitations. Using a survey instrument 
creates an interpretation challenge because, despite careful wording of 
questions, not all participants will interpret the survey questions the same way. 
Moreover, our survey captures some identity characteristics, but not all, so 
there will undoubtedly be areas of social identity that we do not cover—but 
that may nonetheless align closely with race. Our survey, like all surveys, is 
subject to the reality that some participants may choose to answer falsely. 
Because we are surveying current law students in the process of indoctrination 
into a profession that emphasizes ethics, we think the risk of participant 
sabotage is probably less than in surveys administered to the general 
population. Likewise, the survey is subject to biases in that some participants 
may recall certain information about themselves or their families in a way that 
is filtered through their own cognitive biases. It is impossible to eliminate 
these drawbacks from survey-based research, and they are not significant 
enough to invalidate it. 
4. Data Analysis 
We used descriptive statistics (e.g., frequencies and percentages) to 
highlight demographic information, such as the number of students at each 
law school. We also used descriptive statistics to illustrate how many students 
in each racial or ethnic group endorsed race-neutral items on the survey. This 
information is important because it provides a visual overview of which race-
neutral factors participants endorsed more and which they endorsed less. 
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These analyses also allow for a cursory comparison between the racial or 
ethnic groups on which race-neutral factors they endorsed. 
We used inferential statistics to examine the more complex question in 
this study (i.e., “Is there a relationship between law school students’ 
racial/ethnic background and their willingness to endorse race-neutral 
identity factors?”). Examining each race-neutral item on the survey in 
isolation can be informative. However, it is often the case that a single item 
on a survey does not provide sufficient information about race neutrality, nor 
does it allow for inferences about what it means if, for example,  
African–American students endorse a race-neutral item at a much higher rate 
than white students. However, when several race-neutral items on a survey can 
be added together to make a single item, then this provides a more complex 
story about race-neutral factors. More importantly, by combining items, it is 
possible to conduct more complex analyses and draw more meaningful 
inferences from them. To examine whether any of the items on our survey 
were conceptually related with one another, we conducted factor analyses on 
two key survey sections: student background and family background. We then 
created composite variables by combining all conceptually related items. 
These composite variables are important because they have a scoring range 
from low to high so that the higher participant scores on them, the more he 
or she endorses them. 
By creating composite variables of the race-neutral survey items, we were 
able to report, on average, what each racial or ethnic group scored for each 
variable. Higher scores denote greater endorsement of that variable, and 
composite scores also allow for drawing statistically meaningful inferences 
about differences between groups. For this study, we used analyses of variance 
(“ANOVA”) to examine whether there were statistically significant differences 
between racial or ethnic groups on the composite variables that we created 
for the student-background and family-background sections of the survey. 
This analysis allowed us truly to address our research question in a statistically 
meaningful way.  
It is important to mention that six racial or ethnic groups (i.e., white, 
African–American, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, biracial/multiracial, and 
other) were included in all descriptive analyses because we simply reported 
the trends in their responses. Participants who identified as biracial or 
multiracial were those who checked more than one racial or ethnic category 
(e.g., checking both African–American and Cuban). Participants who 
identified as other had a greater range of ethnicities, including Italian, 
German, Arab–American, to name a few. We excluded all participants who 
identified as biracial or multiracial for all inferential statistics because of 
methodological concerns. Biracial or multiracial participants checked more 
than one racial category, which made it difficult to assign them to a 
category.187 Moreover, participants who selected “other” were excluded 
because they were too heterogeneous to be placed in one category. 
 
 187. Considering the current and projected racial demographics of American society and 
the increasing number of biracial and multiracial students attending institutions of higher 
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V. FINDINGS 
We sampled 10 law schools for this study. Five schools were located in the 
northeast region of the United States, three in the southern region, and two 
in the southwestern region. Table 1 provides the racial and gender 
demographics for each school. 
 





















































































































Note: “LS” denotes law school. 
 
The majority of the law schools had slightly more male than female first-
year students. Moreover, with the exception of LS 8 and LS 9, over 70% of 
the first-year student body identified as white. LS 8 had more  
African–American students (81.3%) than other schools, LS 4 had more 
Hispanic students (9.4%), and LS 2 had more Asian/Pacific Islander students 
 
education, an important future area of study will be to examine the extent to which biracial and 
multiracial students endorse race-neutral identity factors and whether their endorsements differ 
from those made by whites and other minority students. See Brown & Bell, supra note 45, at 1234 
n.9 (noting the number of American citizens who self-identified as multiracial in the 2000 Census 
and the racial categories with which they identified). As Professors Brown, Bell and Onwuachi-
Willig have demonstrated, examining students’ racial and ethnic backgrounds, particularly those 
admitted to institutions employing affirmative action, has important implications for student 
diversity in higher education. See id. at 1242–54; see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 45, at 1143 
(discussing the importance of considering “the actual ethnic backgrounds or ancestral heritages 
of . . . students”).  
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(12.3%). Overall, there were 1,035 participants in this study (white [n = 701, 
72.4%], African–American [n = 155, 16.0%], Asian/Pacific Islander [n = 42, 
4.3%], Hispanic [n = 39, 4.0%], Biracial/Multiracial [n = 67, 6.5%], and 
other [n = 31, 3.2%]).  
Our goal for this study was not to compare the ten law schools, but rather 
to aggregate the data from each school to conduct a more comprehensive 
examination of the use of race-neutral factors in law schools generally. We 
report all subsequent analyses and findings on this aggregated data. As 
mentioned earlier, we divided the survey into questions about student 
educational backgrounds and family background. It was important to first 
examine trends in data regarding which race-neutral factors each racial or 
ethnic group endorsed. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for each 
race-neutral student-educational-background survey item, broken down by 
racial or ethnic group. Although racial or ethnic groups are similar on some 
race-neutral items, they differ on others. Overall, African–American and 
Hispanic students endorsed more race-neutral student educational 
background items (e.g., going to high schools that had a majority of racial or 
ethnic minorities, receiving free or reduced lunches in high school, receiving 
Pell Grants as undergraduates) than did other racial or ethnic groups. 
African–American students were the most likely to report high levels of 
uncompensated service to racial groups that the legal profession underserves. 
White and Asian/Pacific Islander students were least likely to endorse race-
neutral student educational background items. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Survey Items Focused on Race-Neutral 
Student Educational Background 
 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for each race-neutral family-
background survey items. Similar to the findings in Table 2, racial or ethnic 
groups were comparable on some items, yet differed on others.  
African–American and biracial or multiracial participants endorsed items 
related to growing up in a single-parent household, growing up on public 
assistance, and having a parent who had been incarcerated more than all 
other racial or ethnic groups. On the other hand, Hispanic students were 
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most likely to grow up in low-income neighborhoods. White and Asian/Pacific 
Islander students endorsed the fewest race-neutral family background items. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Survey Items Focused on Race-Neutral 
Family Background 
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 The descriptive statistics that Tables 2 and 3 present suggest a pattern 
where certain racial or ethnic groups were likely to endorse race-neutral items 
more than other racial or ethnic groups. However, it is difficult to state this 
definitively using descriptive analyses alone. And, although there appears to 
be a clear pattern in the data, it is difficult to draw meaningful inferences from 
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single-item race-neutral factors. Toward this end, we conducted factor 
analyses to examine whether some of the single-item race-neutral factors were 
conceptually related.  
The instrument this study used was a 29-item survey that measured 
demographics, race-neutral aspects of the student’s identity, and attitudinal 
questions about diversity in law school. We conducted factor analyses (with 
varimax rotation)188 on both the race-neutral student-background and family-
background indices. Results from the factor analyses suggest that several items 
on the survey were conceptually related. Thus, it is more methodologically 
sound to examine these items in combined forms than as single items. Specific 
results from the factor analyses show four interpretable factors for the race-
neutral student-background indices: (1) financial need (i.e., qualifying for 
free or reduced lunch in high school; working for pay in high school or 
receiving a Pell Grant as an undergraduate); (2) high-school characteristics 
(i.e., private or public); (3) family “first” status (i.e., first to graduate from a 
high-school or undergraduate program, first to attend law school); and  
(4) ethnic- or race-focused high school or college (i.e., attending a historically 
black college or university (“HBCU”), attending a Hispanic serving 
institution, contributing uncompensated services to underserved groups in 
college). Thus, the single-items in Table 2 fall into one of these four 
categories. For race-neutral family background indices, the factor analysis 
revealed three interpretable factors: (1) family financials (i.e., parents or 
guardians receiving public assistance, household income, non-English spoken 
in household, neighborhood predominately racial or ethnic minority or low 
income); (2) family incarceration (i.e., parents, guardian, or someone in the 
immediate family has been incarcerated); and (3) family composition (i.e., 
growing up in a single-parent household, being raised by a guardian, parents 
under the age of 20 when the student was born). The single items in Table 3 
fall into these three categories, with the exception of religion, which was not 
conceptually related to any of the other items.  
The four factors for student background indices accounted for 54.8% of 
the variance, and the three factors for family background indices accounted 
for 55.5% of the variance. We created composite variables for each 
interpretable factor in order to conduct further inferential analyses. Table 2 
contains one example of a composite variable. There were four single-items 
that were conceptually related: (1) qualifying for free or reduced lunch in 
high school; (2) worked for pay in high school; (3) worked for pay in college; 
and (4) received a Pell Grant as an undergrad. We combined these four items 
and subsumed them under the single factor entitled “financial need.” For all 
composite variables, higher scores indicate greater endorsement of the race-
neutral indices. 
Once we created the composite variables, we were able to show the mean 
score ratings for each racial or ethnic group on both student-background and 
family-background items. Table 4 presents the mean score differences 
 
 188. Varimax is an orthogonal rotation that significantly reduces the chances of multi-
collinearity between variables. 
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between racial or ethnic groups on student-background indices. This table is 
similar to Table 2, with the exception that it illustrates how the single-item 
data from Table 2 actually tells a more complex story. These composite 
variables allow for a more statistically meaningful comparison between racial 
or ethnic groups.  
 
Table 4. Mean Differences Between Racial or Ethnic Groups on Student-
Background Indices 
 

















































Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Standard deviation appears in 
parentheses. H.S. denotes high school and Df denotes degrees of freedom. 
 
We conducted a series of analyses of variance (“ANOVAs”) to determine 
if the mean differences in Table 4 were significantly meaningful. As the 
ANOVA analyses demonstrate, there were main effects for financial needs 
[F(3, 865) = 10.48, p < .001], family-first status [F(3, 923) = 5.12, p < .01], 
and ethnic-or racial-focused high schools and colleges [F(3, 868) = 141.11, p 
< .001], meaning that racial or ethnic groups differed on these variables. We 
conducted a Bonferonni post-hoc analysis to identify where the specific 
difference existed. Post-hoc analyses revealed that African–American and 
Hispanic students scored significantly higher than both white and 
Asian/Pacific Islander students on financial-need indices (e.g., qualifying for 
free or reduced lunch in high school) and ethnic-focused high-school or 
college indices (e.g., attending an HBCU or Hispanic Serving Institution 
(“HSI”)). African–American and Hispanic students also scored significantly 
higher than white students on family first indices. 
Table 5 shows the mean score differences between racial groups on family-
background indices. ANOVA findings reveal main effects for family financials [F(3, 
800) = 32.61, p < .001], family incarceration [F(3, 895) = 7.74, p < .001], and family 
composition [F(3, 920) = 11.26, p < .001]. We again used Bonferonni post-hoc 
analyses to identify where differences existed. Post-hoc analyses indicate that 
African–American and Hispanic students scored significantly higher than 
white and Asian/Pacific Islander students on family-financial indices (e.g., 
parents or guardians received public assistance while growing up). Moreover, 
African–American students scored significantly higher than both white and 
Asian/Pacific Islander students on family-incarceration indices, and they 
scored significantly higher than white students on family-composition indices 
(e.g., growing up in a single-parent household). 
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Table 5. Mean Differences Between Racial or Ethnic Groups on  
Family-Background Indices 
 






































Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Standard deviation appears in 
parentheses. H.S. denotes high school and Df denotes degrees of freedom. 
 
Four questions on the survey measured students’ attitudes about diversity 
in law school. Table 6 shows the mean differences between racial or ethnic 
groups on these variables. We conducted a series of ANOVAs to determine if 
there were significant differences between racial or ethnic groups on these 
attitudinal indices. ANOVA findings revealed that there were main effects for 
students’ attitudes about racial diversity improving students’ educational 
experiences [F(3, 927) = 16.30, p < .001], and for attitudes about 
socioeconomic diversity improving students’ educational outcomes [F(3, 
927) = 6.40, p < .001], suggesting that significant differences existed between 
the racial or ethnic groups. Post-hoc analyses showed that African–American 
and Hispanic students scored significantly higher than white students on both 
of these indices. However, there were no significant differences between racial 
or ethnic groups on attitudes about diversity of students’ experiences and 
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Table 6. Mean Differences Between Racial or Ethnic Groups on 
Diversity Perspectives  
 





































































Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Standard deviation appears in 
parentheses. Df denotes degrees of freedom. 
 
VI. OBSERVATIONS 
This study sought to examine the following research question: Is there a 
relationship between law school students’ racial or ethnic backgrounds and 
their willingness to endorse race-neutral identity factors? Our findings suggest 
that, in the face of constitutional uncertainty, using race-neutral factors may 
enable law schools to maintain current levels of racial diversity without 
considering race in the admissions process. In this study, African–American 
and Hispanic students were significantly more likely than both white and 
Asian/Pacific Islander students to endorse race-neutral factors such as 
qualifying for free or reduced lunch programs in K–12 education, working 
for pay for 10 or more hours while enrolled in high school or an 
undergraduate program, receiving a Pell Grant during their undergraduate 
education, attending a high school where racial minorities comprised the 
majority of the student body, attending HBCUs or HSIs, and having a parent 
or guardian who received public assistance when they were a dependent 
minor. Moreover, African–American students in this study endorsed more 
race-neutral factors than other students, which suggests that using race-
neutral factors may be particularly important for maintaining the current 
levels of African–American students in public law schools. 
The findings of this study suggest that there is room for this type of race-
blind yet race-conscious experimentation by law schools. For law schools in 
jurisdictions that ban higher-education institutions from considering race in 
their admissions, they may be able to use the identity factors identified in this 
study to improve their yield of non-white diverse students. For law schools in 
jurisdictions that permit higher-education institutions to use race in their 
admissions, the study provides one tool that law schools could use to test 
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whether a race-neutral admission cycle could yield a critical mass of racial and 
ethnic minority students from groups that are underrepresented in law 
schools and the legal profession.  
Of course, the findings reported in this study are based on aggregated 
data collected only from the law schools participating in it. Consequently, law 
schools that presently consider race in admissions, yet struggle to achieve even 
low levels of diversity, may suffer a loss in diversity if they stop considering race 
in their quest to achieve racial diversity in their classrooms and campus 
community. Law schools that presently enjoy significant racial diversity in 
their student bodies might consider experimenting with a race-blind 
admissions cycle by asking questions on their applications related to the 
interpretable identity factors presented in the findings of this study in lieu of 
asking about race. For law schools in jurisdictions that permit higher-
education institutions to consider race in their admissions, conducting race-
blind admission cycles will provide them with diversity yield rates that can be 
compared to previous years when they did consider race. If the race-neutral 
admissions cycle yielded significantly less diversity than the diversity achieved 
in years when they did consider race, then the law schools would have 
documented proof that they “considered” race-neutral alternatives before 
resorting to using race, and that they could not achieve comparable diversity 
using race-blind means. Given the Supreme Court’s heightened scrutiny of 
universities’ consideration of race in their admissions decisions,189 possessing 
such information may be critical to defending race conscious affirmative-
action plans against future constitutional challenges. 
It is important to note that, with but a few exceptions, the overwhelming 
majority of the law schools that we surveyed had a paucity of racial diversity 
within their first-year student bodies. This, more than anything, speaks to the 
pressing need for law schools to continue being proactive about increasing 
racial diversity in their student populations. A lack of racial diversity can 
desensitize students to the importance of having racial diversity in the 
classroom. Our findings revealed ideological and attitudinal differences 
between racial groups on perspectives about the role of diversity in law 
schools, suggesting that racial diversity continues to be something that law 
schools must strive to achieve in order to have diverse perspectives in 
classrooms. Our study provides an avenue for how affirmative action in the 
law school context can be race-blind and therefore “race-neutral” by not 
asking applicants about their race, yet be race-conscious by having an 
admissions structure that is mindful of inclusivity and racial diversity. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Considering that law schools serve a unique role in American society and 
“represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders,”190 
it is vital to the future of our democracy that students from historically 
 
 189. See supra Part III.B. 
 190. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).  
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underrepresented racial groups continue to have access to legal education. 
As this Article discussed, the ability of law schools to continue to provide such 
access through the use of race-conscious admissions plans is quite 
uncertain.191 Coupled with the profound lack of racial diversity currently 
plaguing the legal profession,192 law schools’ experimentation with race-
neutral admissions criteria—such as those identity factors tested in our 
study—is both a timely and necessary endeavor. Engaging in this endeavor is 
crucial if we are to fulfill our commitment and duty to educate all law students 
in diverse learning environments and to provide students from diverse 
backgrounds greater access to legal education and the legal profession. 
 
 191. See supra Part III.B.  
 192. See supra Part II.  
